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I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long lamented the Supreme Court's failure to
provide any systematic approach to free speech cases.' They
have noted that free speech law appears vague at best2 and
incoherent at worst.3
1 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 11.1.3, at 932 (3d ed. 2006) (noting "it is not possible to comprehensively flowchart
the First Amendment").
' See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v.
Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 209, 219-22, 233 (noting the lack of guidance
provided by school speech cases in general and Morse in particular).
' See, e.g., Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1249-50 (1995) [hereinafter Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine];
Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
[Vol. 83:10471048
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The school speech cases are typical in this regard, with the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Morse v. Frederick4 only
exacerbating matters.5 At issue in Morse was a school principal's
punishment of a student for displaying a banner that read,
"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."6 As the Morse Court recognized, its past
decisions set forth at least three potential rules for assessing the
constitutionality of restrictions on student speech:
(1) Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District'-whether school officials reasonably conclude that
student expression would "materially and substantially disrupt
the work and discipline of the school"'
(2) Bethel School District v. Fraser 9-whether speech "in the
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate"10 or "plainly
offensive"; 11 and
(3) Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier"12-whether at issue
are "expressive activities that students, parents, and members
of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school."' 3
Rather than relying on any of these formulations, Morse added to
the mix yet another test, one even less readily susceptible to
generalization than the others: "[Sichools [may] restrict student
expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug
use." 4 Indeed, as Frederick Schauer has written about Morse,
two features mark it as distinctive: the importance of clarifying
free speech rights in the school setting, 5 and the Morse Court's
extraordinary failure to achieve that goal.
1 6
Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 98 (1993); Robert F. Nagel, How
Useful Is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 302, 304,
309-11 (1984); Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v.
Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REv. 285, 288, 316.
4 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
' Schauer, supra note 2, at 209-10, 219-22, 233; Douglas Laycock, High-Value
Speech and the Basic Educational Mission of a Public School: Some Preliminary
Thoughts, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 111, 112-13 (2008).
6 Morse, 551 U.S. at 396-98.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8 Morse, 551 U.S. at 394 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
9 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
1o Morse, 551 U.S. at 404 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
' Id. at 443 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
12 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
" Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (majority opinion) (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271).
14 Id. at 408.
1 Schauer, supra note 2, at 208.
16 Id. at 209-10, 219-22, 233.
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This Article is part of an effort to correct this unfortunate
state of affairs. It pursues that task by taking a first step toward
explicating a three-part framework for free speech law. That
framework can be summarized briefly. The great bulk of free
speech doctrines can be understood as assisting in making
three judgments: one about the role of government, 7 another
about the purpose of government action,18 and a third about
costs and benefits.'9 Put together, courts in free speech cases
generally determine: (1) whether government acts on its own
or regulates private conduct; (2)whether it targets expression;
and (3) whether the constitutionally cognizable harms from
the expression outweigh the adverse consequences of its
suppression.2" If government action does not regulate private
conduct, or if it does not target speech, then it generally does not
'" As discussed infra in Part IV, Robert Post has provided the greatest insight to
date on the importance of the role of government in free speech doctrine. See, e.g.,
ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT
(1995) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS]; Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106
YALE L.J. 151, 171-75 (1996) [hereinafter Subsidized Speech]; Robert Post, Between
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1809-16 (1987) [hereinafter Between Government and
Management].
18 Jed Rubenfeld has come closest to recognizing this key judgment. He goes too
far, however, claiming that government action violates the Free Speech Clause if,
and only if, it aims at expression (unless it does so in response to a false factual
assertion).. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 767 (2001). Note, however, that Rubenfeld concedes government may also
restrict expression as manager of an internal governmental function, id. at 819,
although he treats this point as minor.
19 See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment
Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 748 n.33 (2002) (replying to Rubenfeld and arguing
that all of free speech law ultimately involves cost-benefit analysis). But see Jed
Rubenfeld, A Reply to Posner, 54 STAN. L. REV. 753, 753 (2002) (responding to
Posner).
20 Not all harms provide a permissible basis for restricting speech. Some
justifications for such restriction are unacceptable, or at least disfavored. As an
example, courts will not recognize as a legitimate concern that expression may cause
the American public to adopt certain ideas-and that those ideas would be bad for
the American polity. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning
of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way."); see
also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 155 (1995)
(arguing that it is illegitimate for government to suppress speech because, inter alia,
it may prove persuasive); cf. Posner, supra note 19, at 741-42 (noting situations in
which government has been permitted to restrict expression based on supposedly
impermissible justifications).
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run afoul of the Free Speech Clause. On the other hand, if
government action regulates expression, then a court will
undertake a constrained cost-benefit analysis.2'
Toward that end, this Article focuses on the first step of the
framework: the role of government. Part II distinguishes two
roles government can play. First, as a regulator, government
does not undertake its own acts but rather discourages private
conduct.22 In this regard, it might prohibit the distribution of
pamphlets in the public streets.23 When government regulates, it
hampers the expression of private citizens qua private citizens,
implicating the First Amendment.
Government can play a second role that we label as
"patron."24 In that capacity, government itself acts.25 It can do so
by communicating a message or subsidizing expression.2 6 So, for
example, the government might campaign against use of illegal
drugs, putting up posters in public schools and on billboards.
21 We say a "constrained" cost-benefit analysis because courts may not take into
account some kinds of costs. See supra note 20.
22 See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939).
23 Id. at 160; see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1983)
(holding that the sidewalk outside of the Supreme Court building is a public forum);
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515 (1976) (recognizing public streets as public
forums).
24 We use the word "patron" in a way that derives in part from the opening
paragraph of Thomas Paine's famous essay, Common Sense: "Society is produced by
our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness
positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices.
The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron,
the last a punisher." THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 65 (Penguin Classics 1987)
(1776).
Paine's distinction between patron and government involves a similar judgment
about baselines as our use of role of government. A narrower use of the word
'patron-as in "patron of the arts"-captures a subset of the sense of the word we
use in this Article. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
588-89 (1998) (describing federal government as acting as "patron rather than as
sovereign" in subsidizing artistic expression); see also id. at 616 ("However different
the governmental patron may be from the governmental speaker or buyer, the
argument goes, patronage is also singularly different from traditional regulation of
speech, and the limitations placed on the latter would be out of place when applied
to viewpoint discrimination in distributing patronage.") (Souter, J., dissenting).
25 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009).
26 See id. (noting that government can speak for itself or express views through
private sources).
27 See Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IowA L. REV. 1377, 1384-85 (2001) (discussing propriety of government
programs expressing a message).
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Government may even sponsor speech by private actors-offering
a prize, for example, for the best essay demonstrating the ill
effects of the abuse of illegal drugs.28
Government can also act as a patron by performing some
internal function, often in a way analogous to a private
business.29  For example, government may provide postal
services °.3  Toward this end, it may instruct its employees what
to say and what not to say31-to provide accurate information
about postal rates, for example, and not to provide inaccurate
information. As proprietor or "manager"32 of an institution,
government can also take action to ensure that private
individuals do not interfere with tasks it undertakes. Thus, the
post office can prevent citizens from disrupting queues or
interfering with communication inside post offices.3
Similarly, courts as managers of judicial process not only
coerce private citizens to testify truthfully on the witness stand,34
but they also sometimes prohibit litigants from discussing
judicial proceedings outside of court in a way that would interfere
with litigation .3  And the military at times restricts expression
by its members-even the circulation of petitions without prior
approval-to maintain discipline.36  In these instances, no
government official is speaking, nor is government enticing a
28 Id. at 1386-87 (addressing government subsidies of private speech); see also
id. at 1455 (describing Finley as allowing the government to impose a decency
standard to art subsidies in part because "government was not acting in a regulatory
capacity but only in the role of a patron of the arts").
29 See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1098-99 (2009)
("distinguishing between internal governmental operations and private speech" for
First Amendment purposes).
30 See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 122-24 (1981).
31 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (district attorney's office did not
violate the First Amendment when it disciplined a deputy district attorney for a
memorandum written pursuant to the employee's official duties).
32 We use the term in the same manner as Robert Post. See, e.g.,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 4-6.
3 This is implied by the holding in Greenburgh that the U.S. Postal Service
may prevent posting of unstamped letters in people's personal mailboxes. See
Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 129-30.
3 See William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70
CAL. L. REV. 107, 114 (1982) (recognizing that witness testimony is speech and that
courts may nonetheless require it to be truthful).
I See, e.g., Jonathan Eric Pahl, Court-Ordered Restrictions on Trial Participant
Speech, 57 DUKE L.J. 1113, 1115 (2008).
38 See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 348 (1980).
[Vol. 83:10471052
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private citizen to speak on its behalf. Rather government
silences speech as part of an effort to perform one of its internal
functions-to run an orderly post office, a just court system, or an
effective military.
Role of government has great significance for free speech
doctrine. If a court concludes that government action does not
regulate private conduct, but instead that government acts
as a patron, then its restrictions on speech are generally
constitutional. 7 This insight finds support in the application
of free speech doctrine to various settings, including
38 4-39404public forums, government employees, prisons, 4° military,"
unconstitutional conditions,42  and, most relevant, public
schools.43
Part III contends that this understanding of role of
government can explain-and is confirmed by-the school speech
cases. Government may well deliver its own message in the
school setting or encourage others to do so," but in running a
school, it does far more than that. Schools maintain order,45
protect the safety of teachers and students,46 and teach
31 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (noting
that government can control its message as speaker or sponsor of speech); Ysursa v.
Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1098-99 (2009) (recognizing that government
may control speech as part of an internal governmental operation). A tricky issue is
whether government acting as patron ever violates the Free Speech Clause. When
government exceeds the limits under the First Amendment, we say government has
gone beyond its permissible role as a patron and acted as a regulator. One could
also-or instead-say that government acted as a patron in a way that is
unconstitutional, a phrasing that might be valuable in rare contexts.
" See generally, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 199.
31 See supra, note 31.
40 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (allowing prison officials to
limit access of press to prisoners).
41 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 348 (1980) (allowing officials to require
advance approval for circulation of petitions to military personnel).
42 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (applying
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to hold that school teacher cannot be punished
through loss of employment for private speech in a manner insufficiently related to
legitimate government efforts to run state college system).
43 See CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 193 & n.77 (quoting Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)) (noting role of government as
crucial to understanding school speech cases).
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n.3 (noting that
schools may control speech they sponsor).
41 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
4 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 496 U.S. 325, 352-53 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
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substantive knowledge47 as well as appropriate behavior.4" Any
of this conduct can involve silencing student speech as part of a
school's constitutionally permissible role as patron.
But schools can attempt to control speech in ways not
sufficiently related to their role as patron. So, for example, if a
school were to forbid students from speaking in favor of President
Obama in the schoolyard, officials would be hard pressed to show
that this restriction related in any way to a legitimate part
of the curriculum or any other aspect of a school's educational
mission.4 9  As a result, courts would treat the school as a
regulator, subject its actions to strict analysis under the First
Amendment, and almost certainly strike its actions down as
unconstitutional.
Part III further argues that free speech law can be clarified
by separating out the different functions that government
performs as patron in the school setting and by locating the outer
bounds of each function as defined by the First Amendment. In
this regard, schools should have greater latitude to shape the
subjects they teach, for example, than the information students
communicate or seek out on their own.5°
From this perspective, the school speech cases can be largely
reconciled-all, that is, except perhaps for Morse. As we discuss
in Part III.B, Tinker can be understood as a case about a school's
suppression of political speech-prohibiting black armbands
protesting the Vietnam War but not other symbols, including the
Nazi Iron Cross.51 In that context, the Court understandably
treated the school as exceeding its legitimate role as patron of a
school and instead as regulating the speech of students in
violation of the Constitution.52 In contrast, Fraser can be seen as
" See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (noting that a school may
control its curriculum).
" See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507-08 (leaving open the possibility that a school
might restrict student expression to its deportment); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (noting
that a school may restrict expression to teach "habits and manners of civility"
(quoting CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD, MARY RIriTER BEARD & WILLIAM BEARD, NEW
BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968))).
4' As discussed infra Part III.B.1, this can explain the Court's striking down of a
ban on black armbands to protest the Vietnam War in Tinker.
w See Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (noting that schools should have greater freedom in
shaping curriculum than in culling books from library collection that students
explore on their own).
5' See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-11.
52 See id. at 513-14.
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addressing a school's effort to protect students from lewd
language,53 which the Court found to be a legitimate proprietary
function of the school, and Hazelwood as involving a school's
exercise of control over the curriculum by redacting articles from
a school newspaper,54 another legitimate proprietary function.
But Morse is hard to square with Tinker, Fraser, and
Hazelwood. The Court's decision-to permit a school principal
to discriminate by viewpoint in punishing a student
for displaying the "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner on a
public sidewalk 55-suppressed a message with implications
both religious (it mentioned Jesus) and political (it might imply
marijuana should be legalized). The Court deferred to the
school's concern that the banner might undermine its efforts to
inculcate in students an aversion to illegal drugs.56
To be sure, at an abstract level, Morse is consistent with
our framework. In effect, the Court held that the principal
performed a legitimate school function as patron when she
suppressed student speech that she believed encouraged drug
use. But at a more concrete level, the setting and the
justification for the restriction in Morse are disturbing. The
decision leaves open the possibility that school officials may
silence students-even based on their point of view and even on a
public sidewalk-as part of an effort to instill various values. As
Part III concludes, one would have thought that courts would
police vigilantly any claim by school officials to extend their role
as patrons so far.
Part IV explores past scholarly analysis of the role of
government in free speech cases by one of this country's leading
free speech scholars, Robert Post. Part IV.A notes that our
argument is largely consistent with his work. Indeed, he has
analyzed the different roles government can play not only as a
way to understand the Free Speech Clause but also as a window
into the Constitution more generally.5
See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263-64 (1988).
55 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 393, 400 (2007).
56 This deference is apparent in the Court allowing restrictions on student
expression that a school official "reasonably believe[s]" promotes drug use-even,
apparently, if the Court might conclude it does not in fact promote drug use. See id.
at 405, 409-10.
" See generally CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17.
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Part IV.B suggests that the analysis of the school cases can
help to refine Post's theory in a couple of ways: first, by
recognizing the ineluctably normative nature of the effort to
characterize the role of government for free speech purposes and
second, by emphasizing the ways government can act as a patron
in speaking and sponsoring speech and not just in performing an
internal governmental function. Part LV.C then notes how Post's
theory of the First Amendment founders in regard to the second
and third steps in the inherent structure of free speech law.
Finally, we should make clear the nature of our argument at
the outset. Our project is primarily positive, not normative. We
seek to describe the intuitive judgments that in fact drive judges'
decisions, judgments that they sometimes articulate but that
often remain partially or entirely unstated. Our claim is that the
inherent structure of free speech law we identify is the best
rational reconstruction of existing law, not that it is how free
speech law should ideally be designed.58
II. ROLE OF GOVERNMENT: PATRON OR REGULATOR
A. Government Acting on Its Own or Regulating Private
Individuals
Under the framework we suggest, government can play two
different roles that have the potential to interfere with speech:
acting on its own behalf or regulating the conduct of private
citizens. Government acting on its own behalf, we claim, is not
generally constrained by the Free Speech Clause whereas
government as regulator is.
We label the first role of government as "patron."5 9
Government itself can act by speaking,60 sponsoring speech,6' or
5 By making this claim, we may appear to be taking sides in a jurisprudential
debate: in favor of legal positivism and against its critics. But we do not mean-and
we do not think we need-to do so. Our argument can be understood not only by
positivists, but, alternatively, as making a claim primarily about "fit" rather than
"justification," to borrow the terminology of Ronald Dworkin, perhaps the most
famous critic of positivism. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-38
(1986).
" See supra note 24.
' See Subsidized Speech, supra note 17, at 183; Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131-32 (2009) (noting that government may itself
speak).
61 See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (noting that government can control its
message as sponsor of speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-200 (1991)
1056 [Vol. 83:1047
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managing an internal governmental function.62 Consider first
government as speaker. The President may make a public
address, arguing that all Americans should realize that tax cuts
to large businesses are the best way to spur the economy.63 Even
if this address takes a position on a hotly contested political
position-even if it promotes orthodoxy and deviates from
viewpoint neutrality-public citizens suffer no constitutionally
cognizable violation of their free speech rights.6 They remain
free to express opposition to the President's views.
Much the same is true if the government sponsors speech.
The government may offer a prize for the best essay sounding
patriotic themes, and it may publish and disseminate that essay
at the government's expense.65  Such an award would be
available only to people willing to espouse a particular political
position; no critic of American jingoism would qualify. The
winner would, in effect, voluntarily assume the role of
mouthpiece for the government.66 Consequently, the government
may control the messages that it sponsors.67  Thus, a
governmental entity may provide funds to support the
dissemination of information about some forms of family
planning but not others. 6' The government is free to encourage
others to communicate a particular position on a topic, even if the
topic is controversial. 69  The various strictures of the First
Amendment generally do not apply.
(allowing government to control content of message it sponsors); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n.3 (1988) (noting that government can
exercise control over speech it sponsors).
62 See generally CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 4-6, 199-267
(discussing how government may control speech in its managerial capacity); Ysursa
v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (2009) (recognizing that government
may control speech as part of an internal governmental operation).
See Subsidized Speech, supra note 17, at 183.
See, e.g., Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying
Expression's Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 589 (2008) (recognizing that the Supreme
Court has "shielded" government speech from scrutiny under the Free Speech
Clause).
6 See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 27, at 1384-85 (discussing propriety of
government programs expressing a message).
6 See id. (discussing government programs expressing a particular message).
67 See id. at 1385.
6 See id. at 1384-85.
69 See Rosenberg v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)
(interpreting Rust as allowing government to sponsor speech on family planning
only if it does not include abortion).
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Courts and commentators have been attentive to the limited
impact of the First Amendment when the government speaks or
sponsors speech. 70 However, they generally have not recognized
that free speech rights have the same limited effect when
government manages an internal operation in a manner similar
to a private entity.7' Along these lines, government may
undertake an enterprise that competes with private companies-
the U.S. Postal Service is an example 72--or that is distinctly part
of the government-such as the prosecution of criminal cases.73
In this role of government as manager, the Postal Service can
require its employees to quote the price of stamps accurately and
a prosecutor's office can control the viewpoints expressed by its
employees as necessary to perform their jobs.74 The same is true
for court orders preventing litigants from discussing litigation,75
military restrictions on circulating petitions, 76 and prison officials
limiting access to prisoners.77 As long as the government
remains within its permissible role as patron, it generally does
not run afoul of the First Amendment.
At other times, the government acts as a regulator. It does
not declare an official position, subsidize communication of a
specific message, or operate an internal function, but rather
70 See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 27, at 1384; Norton, supra note 64, at
588; Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 607 (2008).
71 There are some exceptions. See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S.
Ct. 1093, 1098-99 (recognizing that government may control speech as part of
internal governmental operation); CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 4-6,
199-267.
72 See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civil Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
129-30 (1981) (discussing permissibility of U.S. Postal Service restricting use of
private mailboxes).
'3 See supra note 31. Of course, prosecuting criminal cases is now a purely public
function, even if it was once also a private endeavor. See Stephen C. Yeazell,
Socializing Law, Privatizing Law, Monopolizing Law, Accessing Law, 39 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 691, 691 (2006).
" See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419. Note that the more precise rule from Garcetti-
that any expression that is part of a government employee's job duties is subject to
government control, id. at 421-is not necessitated by the more general proposition
in the text.
15 See, e.g., Pahl, supra note 35, at 1115.
76 See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980).
11 See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974).
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controls the speech of private citizens."8  It is when the
government acts in this role that the First Amendment plays its
part.
This distinction between the government acting as a patron
and a regulator-between the government itself acting and the
government interfering with the speech of private citizens-can
make sense of various free speech doctrines, including the school
speech cases.
B. Characterizing the Role of Government Resolves Many Cases
A judgment about the role of government can play a
crucial-often dispositive-part in free speech cases. In many
instances, the conclusion that the government acts as a patron
is tantamount to holding that its conduct is constitutional,
and the contrary conclusion that the government acts as a
regulator in effect means that the conduct is unconstitutional.
Sometimes this distinction is obvious. Schools may require their
mathematics teachers to spend the bulk of their time during
class hours teaching mathematics and not discussing politics.79
That falls well within the school's role as patron. Schools may
not, however, require that those same teachers allocate their
time in similar proportions once they go home from school for
the day. 0 That requirement is not sufficiently related to a
school's job of educating students, so the government would be
regulating teachers' speech as private citizens in a way that is
unconstitutional. 1
On other occasions, identifying whether the government acts
as a patron or as a regulator is much more difficult, but the
consequences of that determination are just as significant.
78 Note that Post often distinguishes the roles as governance and management.
See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 199-267.
79 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113-14 (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring) ("I am also not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school children
takes with him into the classroom a constitutional right to teach sociological,
economic, political, or religious subjects that the school's managers do not want
discussed .... '[Wihile fundamental in our democratic society, [free speech rights]
still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a
group at any public place and at any time.'" (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
554 (1965))).
so See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 595-97 (1972) (holding that a
school teacher cannot be punished through the loss of employment for private
speech).
"' Id. at 598.
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Compare, for example, Rust v. Sullivan8 2 with Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of University of Virgina. Rust held that it
was constitutional for the government to prevent recipients of
Title X funds, and their employees, from speaking while on the
job in favor of abortion as a method of family planning.'M Rust is
a particularly powerful example of the significance of a Court's
determination that government acts as patron rather than as
regulator."5 Rust held that government as patron may fund only
the message it wants-that it may even engage in viewpoint
discrimination-without violating the First Amendment.86
Often a contrary conclusion-that government acts as
regulator, not as patron-produces just the opposite result: the
striking down of a restriction on speech as unconstitutional.
Rosenberger, for example, addressed the possible application of
Rust to the disbursement of funds by a university to students.
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia refused to fund a
group that published a Christian magazine.8 8 The school's
decision might have been interpreted either as necessary to
control communication through students of the university's own
secular message or as inconsistent with the university's goal of
encouraging private speech of various perspectives. The Court
chose the latter view, and, as a result, held that the University's
policy violated the First Amendment. 9
In so ruling, Rosenberger explained that in Rust, the
government "used private speakers to transmit specific
information pertaining to its own program,"90 while in
Rosenberger, the University's program was instead an effort "to
encourage private speech."91 The Court held that viewpoint
discrimination is improper "when the University does not itself
82 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
83 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
8 Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-200.
15 See id. at 193.
' See id. Rosenberger summarized the lesson from Rust as follows: "When the
government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental
message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is
neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
87 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
88 Id. at 826-27.
89 Id. at 837.
o Id. at 833.
91 Id. As discussed below, we do not believe that viewpoint discrimination in
restricting speech is necessarily unconstitutional. See infra Part III.E.3.
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speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead
expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers."92 The Court continued, "A holding that the University
may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons
whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University's own
speech, which is controlled by different principles."93 In other
words, if the government itself speaks-acting as patron-it
has far greater leeway under the First Amendment than if it
interferes with the speech of private persons-regulating the
speech of others.94 Once the Court concluded that the University
of Virginia acted as regulator in Rosenberger, not as patron, the
result followed almost inevitably under the circumstances that
the University of Virginia's conduct was unconstitutional.95
C. Judicial Efforts To Characterize the Role of Government
Courts must police the boundary between government as
patron and regulator. Consider, for example, government as
employer. Government restrictions on employee speech may
simply be part of its effort to accomplish legitimate aims. A
district attorney's office, for example, must be able to evaluate
the quality of the memoranda its employees write if the
9' Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
93 Id.
94 Rosenberger thus casts a valuable light on the distinction between
government, on one hand, speaking or subsidizing speech and, on the other hand,
interfering with the speech of private citizens. Yet it omits the possibility of
government acting as manager and, in that capacity, restricting speech in a way
that discriminates by viewpoint to prevent disruption of a legitimate internal
government function. A similar point may explain the Court's struggle in Board of
Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000), which upheld a mandatory student fee
at the University of Wisconsin used to finance student organizations. Id. at 221. The
Court recognized some relevance to public forum cases but did not quite identify the
underlying judgment about government as patron, a role that can include not only
government speaking and sponsoring speech, but also acting as a proprietor. See
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 27, at 1423-29 (discussing Southworth and the
difficulty the Court had fitting it into traditional free speech categories).
', See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834-37. To be sure, the Court's judgment in
Rosenberger can be questioned, as can its judgment in Rust. Note, however, the
possibility that the Court characterized the actions of the University of Virginia
accurately and that the school favored-but was apprehensive about-funding a
religious group lest it violate the Establishment Clause. For an excellent analysis
along these lines see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 35-38 (2007).
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government is going to be effective in enforcing laws.96 Yet left
unchecked, government could regulate the speech of employees
unrelated to their work and use the pretext of maintaining a
functioning workplace to avoid scrutiny under the First
Amendment.97
Courts at times have shown some recognition of the
importance of their characterization of the role of government in
free speech cases. But they generally veer away from a
forthright assessment of the issue. They tend, instead, to invoke
conclusory labels, formalistic distinctions, and arbitrary and
technical rules. As a result, judicial opinions leave in their wake
little meaningful guidance for assessing the role government
plays-and may play-in various contexts. Indeed, if judges do
explain their reasoning, they tend to provide black letter law that
seizes on an incidental aspect of the case before them-or of past
decisions they are distinguishing-rather than on the key
underlying judgment. That judgment would require separating
out the legitimate functions government can perform as patron in
a particular setting and assessing the appropriate constitutional
constraints on each one.
Free speech cases applying the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine are representative in this regard. In Perry v.
Sindermann,9 8 for example, the Court addressed the termination
of a public college teacher allegedly for exercising his free speech
rights, including for criticizing the college's board of regents.99
The Court in Perry recognized that even if the teacher had no
legal right to his position, the government may have violated his
free speech rights by not continuing his employment, as is
reflected in an oft-quoted passage:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that
even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of
" See Garcetti v. Cebalios, 547 U.S. 410, 418-19 (2006) (distinguishing
government as employer from government as regulator of private conduct).
" See id. at 419.
98 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
" Id. at 595.
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speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person
because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations,
his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited.100
This quotation takes an important step toward putting aside
a wooden formalism in assessing the role of government for free
speech purposes. As the Court recognized, at least implicitly, if
government withholds the "benefit" of employment from a
teacher for exercising his or her free speech rights as a private
citizen, the government has strayed into regulating and First
Amendment strictures apply. 101 It did not matter whether Perry
was entitled to employment. 10 2
But stating, as the Court did, that government cannot
deprive one of its employees of a job for exercising free speech
rights0 3 begs the question. The issue is the scope of those
rights-what government employee speech is protected by the
First Amendment and what speech is not. That issue turns on
the role of government. Framed this way, the Court's reasoning
becomes clear. Government as manager may restrict its
employees' speech in ways legitimately related to enhancing a
state college system. But once government exceeds that role, it
assumes the capacity of regulator and its actions are subject to
scrutiny under the First Amendment.' 4
We suggest that in many of the cases in which courts have
articulated arbitrary or even silly free speech rules, the real
problem was that the role of government was not clear. This is
true of various Supreme Court decisions-the Court has
recognized to some degree the crucial distinction between
government as patron and regulator, it has even at times
indicated the significance of the distinction, but it has not
grappled with it directly.
Board of Education v. Pico'0 5 is illustrative. At issue was the
decision of a local school board to remove certain books from
school libraries allegedly because they were "anti-American,
100 Id. at 597.
101 See id.
"0' See id. at 597-98.
1o See id. at 598.
1 4 See id. The Court remanded the case because the lower court had not
performed an analysis under the First Amendment. See id.
105 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy."10 6  Justice
Brennan announced the judgment of the Court and wrote for a
plurality, recognizing that school boards have great discretion in
maintaining a school library but suggested that such discretion is
not without bounds.' 7 In particular, he concluded that a school
board cannot make decisions about the library collection "in a
narrowly partisan or political manner."' Thus, a "Democratic
school board, motivated by party affiliation" could not
"remov[e] ... all books written by or in favor of Republicans" and
an "all-white school board, motivated by racial animus" could not
"remove all books authored by blacks or advocating racial
equality and integration."10 9  He concluded that "whether
petitioners' removal of books from their school libraries [violated
the] First Amendment... depend[ed] upon the motivation
behind [the school board's] actions." 110
Justice Brennan then added somewhat cryptically:
"[N]othing in our decision today affects in any way the discretion
of a local school board to choose books to add to the libraries of
their schools. Because we are concerned in this case with the
suppression of ideas, our holding today affects only the discretion
to remove books.""'
This enigmatic distinction between adding and removing
books is symptomatic of the problems with the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence. It would seem a library could arrive
at the very same collection-for the very same reasons-by either
means." 2 But Brennan's reasoning strongly suggests, if it does
not directly express, his intuitive understanding that government
,o Id. at 857.
107 Id. at 863-65.
'0" Id. at 870.
'o Id. at 870-7 1.
o Id. at 871.
"1 Id. at 871-72 (emphasis in original).
112 The Supreme Court in Pico remanded the case for a determination of the
motivation behind the removal of books-whether the school board removed the
books to deny students "access to ideas" with which it disagreed, id. at 871, or to
protect students from "books [that] were pervasively vulgar." Id. at 875. This kind of
judicial reasoning inspired the writings of Professor Elena Kagan, who argues
that free speech doctrine is designed to prevent government action based on an
impermissible motive. See generally Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:
The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CI. L. REV.
413 (1996). We believe that Kagan could be much clearer about what she means by
motive if she separated out the three judgments relevant to free speech cases, but
that argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
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acting as manager-in assembling a school library-has leeway
under the First Amendment that government as regulator-in
censoring specific books for narrowly partisan reasons-does not.
Had he addressed this issue squarely, the opinion might have
been more instructive.
A couple of other aspects of Justice Brennan's opinion
warrant attention. First, he recognized that the latitude
government enjoys under the First Amendment depends in part
on which function it performs, indicating that government should
have greater discretion-perhaps even "unfettered discretion" 13 -
when shaping the school curriculum but less discretion in
selecting books for a library from which students are allowed
"free choice" and through which students may pursue "self-
education and individual enrichment that is wholly optional."1 4
In other words, a school may exercise greater control over its
curriculum than over the information students may seek on
their own through a school library. This insight is valuable.
Free speech doctrine could become more understandable and
predictable if courts were to divide government's role as patron
into different functions and demarcate over time the limits of
each one.
Also crucial in Pico is Justice Brennan's statement that
government, even in a school setting, cannot impose a "narrowly
partisan" political orthodoxy."' Although defining the contours
of such an orthodoxy is difficult, the general point resonates
throughout free speech doctrine: Government cannot require its
citizens to subscribe to a particular set of political (or religious)
beliefs." 6 When it attempts to do so, it acts as regulator-rather
than manager-and violates the First Amendment.
1 Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (emphasis in original).
1 Id. at 869. Schools, it would seem, may not actually have unfettered
discretion in regard to the curriculum, as is suggested in the Supreme Court's
decision in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), which struck down a Nebraska
statute prohibiting instruction in the German language. Id. at 402-03. Of course,
Meyer did not hold that schools are required to teach German, but it did seem to
recognize some constraints on the school curriculum, including that schools cannot
impose a political or religious orthodoxy as part of their instruction. Morse v. United
States, 551 U.S. 393, 421 n.8 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
115 Pico, 457 U.S. at 870.
116 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion .... ."); Morse, 551 U.S. at 408-09 (noting that government cannot
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None of this is to say that drawing the line between
government as patron and regulator would ever be easy. Judges
can, and will, disagree in cases like Pico. Instead, our goal is to
emphasize the key judgment, its significance, and the way in
which courts tend to lose sight of both. The key judgment is
about the role of government. The significance of that judgment
is that when government acts within its legitimate role as a
patron, its restrictions on speech are generally constitutional.
Only if the government adopts the role of regulator do courts
subject such restrictions to a searching review under the First
Amendment. But in undertaking the difficult task of
distinguishing between government as regulator and patron-
indeed, perhaps in part because of its difficulty-courts have
relied on imperfect, even clumsy, proxies. The proxies have come
to obscure the key underlying judgment in many settings,
including in public schools.
D. The Dual Constraints on Government as Patron
Generally speaking, two sources constrain government as
patron under the Free Speech Clause: the flexible limits that
derive from how government defines its own mission"7 and the
rigid limits imposed by the Constitution."'8
Consider the school setting. A school's mission can derive
from the state or federal law authorizing government to run a
school, as well as from the decisions of school administrators and
teachers. 19 Schools have freedom to structure the education they
provide in various ways, but any given structure may give rise to
certain limitations. An example from the university setting is
Rosenberger, which is helpful once again in juxtaposition to the
Court's earlier decision in Rust.
restrict political or religious expression, even in a school setting). Note that this is a
source of constraint on the cost-benefit analysis in the third step of the inherent
structure of free speech law. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
11 See Between Government and Management, supra note 17, at 1801-04
(discussing government's ability to change social practices and thereby alter the
requirements of the First Amendment).
118 See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the First
Amendment constrains a school's ability to alter First Amendment rights by defining
its own mission).
119 Id.
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As noted above, the Court interpreted the government's
definition of its own mission in Rust as communicating a
particular message about birth control, one that did not include
abortion. 120 In contrast, the Court interpreted the mission of the
University of Virginia in Rosenberger as creating an open forum
for student speech, not as communicating a particular secular
message. 121  In these cases, a crucial part was played by the
Court's reading of how the government defined its own mission
and by the Court's assessment that in Rosenberger, but not in
Rust, the government deviated from that mission, and therefore,
strayed from acting as patron into acting as regulator.
The second source of restrictions on the government's role as
patron is built into the Constitution. It does not vary depending
on how government chooses to define its mission. Justice
Brennan's hypothetical situations in Pico provide useful-if
extreme-examples of the outer bounds the Constitution places
on the role of a school as patron. 122 If a school board were to
ban all books written "by or in favor of Republicans," or "by
blacks or advocating racial equality and integration," the courts
presumably would strike these down as unconstitutional
violations of free speech rights regardless of how the school
defined its mission. 23 Indeed, Justice Alito, concurring in Morse,
recognized the irreducible role of the Constitution in constraining
a school's interference with expression. He refused to give school
officials free reign to define their own mission-and pursue that
mission through restrictions on expression-because "some
public schools have defined their educational missions as
including the inculcation of whatever political and social views
120 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-200 (1991).
121 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832-34
(1995).
122 Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-71.
12 Id. at 871; cf. Laycock, supra note 5, at 119-20 (questioning whether
imposing orthodox political or religious views would violate the Free Speech Clause).
A possible explanation for this conclusion is that under these circumstances, the
school board would be engaging in viewpoint discrimination, which is impermissible
in all instances. The truth, however, is that school officials engage in viewpoint
discrimination all the time. They do so, for example, if they choose to stock books
about astronomy but not astrology. The reality is that the Constitution permits
viewpoint discrimination as part of a government's legitimate role as proprietor of a
school but not when government acts in a way that strays beyond that role. See infra
Part III.E.3.
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are held by the members of these groups." 24 Such ends are not
necessarily a constitutionally legitimate part of the managerial
functions of public schools. 125
E. Institutional Setting
The latitude courts will give in allowing government to
restrict expression as a proprietor cannot be defined in general
terms. It varies by institutional context. Courts give
government a great deal of leeway in operating the military126
and prisons. 27 The compelling need for discipline in both
settings allows for a substantial curtailment of expression. 12  At
the opposite end of the continuum are public streets, sidewalks,
and parks. 129  The government needs to maintain some rules
regarding these venues-through speed limits, parade permits,
and the like 03--but the government serves no legitimate ends if
it obstructs discussion and debate. The public forum doctrine
plays a part in judicial assessment of this issue, identifying the
legitimate functions government may need to perform and the
correlative restrictions on expression that are permissible on
government property.13
Public schools give rise to particularly thorny issues
regarding the legitimate functions government may perform as a
proprietor. They fall somewhere in the middle of the
continuum-or, perhaps more accurately, they lie on both ends of
124 551 U.S. at 423. Similarly, Professor Laycock has criticized the school's
argument in Morse as an "alarmingly broad proposal, because it was offered without
discussion of what the public school's basic educational mission is, and with no
suggested limits on school officials' ability to define their own mission in ways that
justify broad censorship." Laycock, supra note 5, at 113-14.
125 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423-24 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
126 See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (quoting Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 744, 758 (1974)).
127 See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
12 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 11.4.4, at 1146-50 (citing Brown, 444 U.S. at
356).
129 See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515 (1976) ("[Sltreets, sidewalks,
parks and other similar public places are so historically associated with the exercise
of First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of exercising
such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely." (quoting
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 315 (1968))).
130 Government is permitted to do so under the time, place, and manner
doctrine. See Post, supra note 3, at 1260-61.
131 See Between Government and Management, supra note 17, at 1781-82.
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the continuum at once. On one hand, the public school could be a
context where the need to allow free speech is at a premium.
Students are members of the general public and their attendance
is required. 13 2 They are also learning to be citizens in a society
that confers constitutional protection on free speech-a society
that will benefit from students learning how to contend with the
free expression of ideas. 3' Moreover, students are young and,
as such, may be particularly vulnerable to the imposition of
orthodox views. Unless schools take special measures to assist
them to develop their own, independent ideas, they may be all too
willing to conform to a perceived consensus or to the perspective
of authority figures.
On the other hand, schools may need substantial latitude to
restrict student expression to achieve all we expect of them. In
many ways, schools serve a role similar to that of parents. 131
They help students to develop so as to live happy and successful
lives and to participate as responsible citizens in a democracy. 136
That may require students to be exposed to some of the core
values of our society-and to be protected from some of its most
corrupting influences. Effective participation in a democratic
society requires not only comfort with free debate, but also the
judgment to exercise that freedom responsibly. 137 And student
132 Of course, students may attend private schools. But for many students,
financial restrictions make mandatory school attendance tantamount to mandatory
public school attendance. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (noting that most parents have no choice but to send their children to
public schools).
13 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969)
(quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
'1 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (recognizing the risk in
religious matters that a school might use "indirect coercion" to "enforce a religious
orthodoxy").
135 Justice Thomas's concurrence in Morse adopted an extreme version of this
view. Relying on historical practice-as he is wont to do-he concluded: "In my view,
the history of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as originally
understood, does not protect student speech in public schools." 551 U.S. at 410-11
(Thomas, J., concurring). Invoking the common law doctrine of in loco parentis, he
reasoned that schools could perform a function analogous to that of parents-with
similar latitude to punish student expression. Id. at 412-14, 416.
136 See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (noting
role of schools in teaching responsibe citizenry).
137 Id.
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vulnerability to peer pressure 13  may justify a school in
controlling the expression of some students to protect the
sensibilities and values of others.
139
F. Summary
Taking these various strands of doctrine together, it is
possible to summarize the rules regarding the role of government
and free speech doctrine. Government can play the role of patron
by speaking, sponsoring speech, or managing an internal
government function. As patron, government has great
discretion to interfere with expression, even by engaging in
viewpoint discrimination. But two sources constrain government
as patron: government's definition of its own mission and
limitations built into the Constitution. The latitude government
has to restrict expression as part of its mission will depend on
institutional context. With this framework in place, we are in a
position to assess the school speech cases.
III. ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE SCHOOL CONTEXT
Morse v. Frederick14 ° is an extreme example of a general
tendency in free speech law: It articulates a specific rule for
dealing with a subset of free speech cases without making clear
how that rule fits into the rest of the doctrine or what underlying
purpose it serves.' 4 ' This tendency makes free speech doctrine
difficult to apply, as is manifest in the free speech cases that
Morse discussed, particularly Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood.
According to Morse, the Court in the past has articulated various
tests for determining the constitutionality of restrictions on
11 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (noting the effect of peer pressure in imposing
religious orthodoxy in school setting).
139 As discussed below, this is one way to read Fraser, see infra Part III.B.2, and,
more awkwardly, Morse. See infra Part III.B.4.
140 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
141 This understanding of Morse is reflected in various critiques of the decision.
See Schauer, supra note 2, at 209-10, 219-22, 233; Hans Bader, Bong Hits 4 Jesus:
The First Amendment Takes a Hit, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 133, 133; Joanna Nairn,
Recent Development, Free Speech 4 Students? Morse v. Frederick and the
Inculcation of Values in Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 239, 239 (2008) (noting
that Morse failed to clarify free speech doctrine in student speech cases-an area
already confused by the rules from Fraser and Hazelwood-and instead fashioned
"merely another exception to Tinker"). Douglas Laycock suggests this lack of
guidance in Morse is preferable to any general principle the Court was likely to
articulate. See Laycock, supra note 5, at 112-14.
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speech imposed by school administrators.14 2 But the Morse Court
made no attempt to explain the organizing principles for these
tests, making difficult at least three essential tasks: (1) defining
the rule from a particular student speech case;14 3 (2) selecting the
possible rule or rules to apply in a school speech case; and
(3) determining to what extent, if at all, the ordinary free speech
rules extend to a case that implicates the school environment. 44
The key to organizing the school speech cases is the
recognition that Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse all involve
a judgment about the role of government. This understanding
reveals a Court struggling to define the metes and bounds that
the First Amendment places on a public school's mission. The
rules from these cases then appear not merely as ad hoc means to
resolve various free speech issues in public education, but as
following from an effort to define the role government may play
in educating students-and from a battle between competing
views of that role. Reconciling the cases requires attention to the
different educational functions in Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and
Morse.
The Court at times has partially recognized the nature of the
judgment at stake in student speech cases. But it also has
tended to elide that judgment, focusing instead on technical rules
and incidental circumstances of particular cases. As a result, in
reading these cases, it is easy to miss the central importance of
drawing the line between government as patron and regulator.
142 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (acknowledging a "'substantial disruption'
analysis" (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969)) and a "legitimate pedagogical concerns" analysis (quoting Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988))).
14 The rule from Fraser is variously articulated as permitting the prohibition of
only "school-sponsored speech," or more broadly as allowing the curtailment of
"vulgar" or "lewd" expression, or even permitting a ban on all "plainly offensive"
speech. See David L. Hudson & John E. Ferguson, The Courts' Inconsistent
Treatment of Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 191-201 (2002) (discussing the circuit split resulting from
inconsistent interpretations of Fraser); see also Jerry C. Chiang, Plainly Offensive
Babel: An Analytical Framework for Regulating Plainly Offensive Speech in Public
Schools, 82 WASH. L. REV. 403, 405 (2007) (arguing that Fraser's methodology
requires the application of a three-part test to determine whether speech is plainly
offensive, considering the content, context, and consequences of the student speech).
'" For example, it is not clear whether student speech cases fit into the public
forum or content-based speech analyses or if student speech cases form a distinct
category subject to their own separate analysis. See Andrew H. Montroll, Note,
Students' Free Speech Rights in Public Schools: Content-Based Versus Public Forum
Restrictions, 13 VT. L. REV. 493, 494-95 (1989).
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A. Confusion about Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse
1. Tinker
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District145 involved a school ban on students wearing black
armbands to protest the Vietnam War,14 6 although the school had
allowed students to wear other symbols, including buttons from
national campaigns and even "the Iron Cross, traditionally a
symbol of Nazism."14' The Court held that the school's effort to
suppress the armbands violated the First Amendment.
148
The specific rule from Tinker is open to interpretation. 149 In
one formulation from the majority opinion, Tinker held that the
14 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
146 Id. at 504.
147 Id. at 510.
148 Id. at 514.
149 Professor Sheldon H. Nahmod, for example, explains the rule from Tinker as
permitting the prior restraint of student speech that school officials reasonably
believe will disrupt school operations or impinge on the rights of other students.
Sheldon H. Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The
Scope of Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1479, 1483-85 (1972); see also Thomas
C. Fischer, "Whatever Happened to Mary Beth Tinker" and Other Sagas in the
Academic "Marketplace of Ideas," 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 351, 355 (1993). Other
commentators posit that Tinker prohibits only student speech that actually disrupts
the work of the school or violates the rights of others. See Michael A. Rebell,
Overview: Education and the Law: Schools, Values, and the Courts, 7 YALE L. &
POLVY REV. 275, 304 (1989).
Confusion over Tinker is also reflected in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harper v.
Poway Unified School District, 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 549 U.S. 1262
(2007). A desire to prevent mere discomfort generally cannot justify suppression of
student speech, but Harper held that the need to protect groups from derogatory
comments can. Id. at 1192. According to the majority, the injury to students from a
derogatory message-particularly "students who are members of minority groups
that have historically been oppressed, subjected to verbal and physical abuse, and
made to feel inferior," id. at 1178-constitutes a rights violation under Tinker. Id. at
1175. It distinguished between positive and negative messages, holding that schools
may prohibit demeaning statements on a t-shirt directed toward other students
because the statements infringe the rights of those other students. See id; see also
Jerico Lavarias, A Reexamination of the Tinker Standard: Freedom of Speech in
Public Schools, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 575, 576-77 (2008) (discussing Harper and
dress code regulations under Tinker). Judge Kozinski in his dissent argued that
Tinker prohibited the school's silencing of student speech in Harper. Harper, 445
F.3d at 1192-1207 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Similarly, Lavarias argues that "the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning [in Harperl strongly conflicts with Tinker," and that "if the
Court in Tinker used the same analysis [as] in the majority opinion of Harper, school
officials would have been justified in censoring Mary Beth Tinker's armband ... if
other students could have felt demeaned by her 'negative view'...." Lavarias,
supra, at 578 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504).
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school must allow student expression unless it "would materially
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school"
or violate other students' rights.150  A school, then, can restrict
speech to prevent a material and substantial disruption of
"classwork."15 '
There are at least two possible interpretations of what
constitutes the relevant sort of disruption of work and discipline.
According to one view, Tinker leaves a great deal of room for
student speech. Students have substantial latitude to express
their thoughts and feelings. Only if a school acts to prevent
disorder or harm to students-not, as the Court put the matter,
out of "a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint"'52 or "an urgent
wish to avoid the controversy which might result from the
expression" 153 -may school officials silence students.'54
But the Tinker Court did not embrace this view fully. To the
contrary, it noted that the case before it did not relate "to
regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair
style, or deportment." 155 The Court thus did not foreclose schools
from constraining student expression as part of an overall effort
to shape student appearance and manners. 6 Further, teachers
150 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14 (citing Hammond v. S.C. State College, 272 F.
Supp 947 (D.S.C. 1967)).
151 Id. (citing Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 753-54
(5th Cir. 1966)).
152 Id. at 509.
" Id. at 510.
154 For an interpretation along these lines-and decrying Morse v. Frederick as a
departure from this rule-see RONALD DWORKIN, THE SUPREME COURT PHALANX:
THE COURT'S NEW RIGHT-WING BLOC 60-62 (2008).
" Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507-08 (citing Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392
F.2d 697, 704 (5th Cir, 1968); Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 250 S.W. 538,539-40 (Ark.
1923)).
11 This possibility can explain the decisions of numerous district and circuit
courts upholding dress codes. They have tended to rely on either of Tinker's prongs:
the need to prevent a "material and substantial disruption" or an invasion of "the
rights of others." See, e.g., Phillips v. Anderson County Sch. Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp.
488, 489 (D.S.C. 1997) (finding that school had a reasonable basis for predicting that
student's jacket made to look like the Confederate flag would produce a material and
substantial disruption); Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1175
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that school officials permissibly suspended a student who
wore a homemade t-shirt demeaning homosexuality because the restricted speech
infringed on the rights of other students). Neither Tinker prong fits school uniforms
very well, which may explain why the Ninth Circuit recently went to great lengths
to conclude that Tinker does not apply in such circumstances and that instead
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routinely reward or punish student speech-giving or taking
away points, for example, for right and wrong answers in the
classroom or on quizzes, for memorizing a particular poem
the teacher selects, or for writing a successful essay from a
perspective that the teacher assigns. Surely courts should
not assess each of these practices in a particular setting-or
even each specific question and answer on examinations-to
determine whether a lesser restriction on student expression
would be possible without disrupting the classroom. Tinker left
open the possibility that a school could suppress speech to
prevent interference with any legitimate school function.
1 7
2. Fraser
If the holding of Tinker is ambiguous, Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser15  made matters much more confusing. In
Fraser, school officials suspended a student for two days for using
"an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor" at an
assembly in nominating a student for elective office.'59 The Court
ruled that the suspension did not violate the student's free
speech rights.160
Consider the difficulty of interpreting Fraser's treatment of
Tinker.161  If Fraser departed from Tinker and created a new
rule for student speech, it is unclear what that rule is or
mandatory school dress codes are subject only to intermediate scrutiny. Jacobs v.
Clark County Sch. Dist, 526 F.3d 419, 434-35 (9th Cir. 2008).
"' This interpretation is consistent with Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675 (1986), which quoted Tinker and suggested that inculcating values is part
of the "work of the schools." Id. at 683 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508) (internal
quotations omitted).
1- 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
151 Id. at 678.
160 Id. at 685-86.
161 Beginning with the immediate aftermath of Fraser, comments and casenotes
on the decision diverge on this issue. See, e.g., Carol M. Schwetschenau, Case Note,
Constitutional Protection for Student Speech in Public High Schools: Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1349, 1359-60
(1986) (noting that, while the facts of Fraser were distinguishable from those of
Tinker, the actions of the school officials in both cases were consistent with the
inculcative function of schools); accord Therese Thibodeaux, Case Note, Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser: The Supreme Court Supports School in
Sanctioning Student for Sexual Innuendo in Speech, 33 LOY. L. REV. 516, 521-23
(1987). But see Sara Slaff, Note, Silencing Student Speech: Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraser, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 217 (1987) (arguing that the Fraser Court
"refused to apply the standard it had established in Tinker reasoning that Tinker
applied only to political speech").
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when it applies. The Court stated generally that schools
may punish "inappropriate"--or, perhaps, "plainly offensive"--
speech. 162  Almost any speech could fall within this category,
including the armbands in Tinker.163 Fraser left key questions
unanswered: What student speech does the rule from Fraser
protect, and how is a court to decide whether to apply the more
demanding rule from Tinker or the more forgiving rule from
Fraser?
Alternatively, the Fraser Court may have believed it was
following Tinker.6 4  The Fraser Court certainly cited Tinker
quite a bit.'65 Fraser further asserted, quoting from Tinker, that
part of the "'work of the schools'" is to "'inculcat[e]'" the
"'fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system,'. . . [that] the use of terms of debate
highly offensive or highly threatening to others"1 66 is inconsistent
with those fundamental values and that the student's "vulgar
and offensive" speech, therefore, interfered with the school's
work. 1 67 If pursuing these and related goals is the proper "work"
of a public school, and the lewd speech "disrupted" that work,
Fraser may have simply applied Tinker, albeit in a way that
greatly expanded the reasons schools may restrict expression,
including to instill values in students.
Fraser thus muddied the rule of Tinker, arguably creating an
additional ambiguous rule for student speech.
3. Hazelwood
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier did little to clarify
the law. 16  That case involved a school's refusal to publish two
articles written by students, one describing three students'
experiences with pregnancy and the other addressing the impact
162 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
1'6 For this reason, Morse rejected a broad reading of this language from Fraser.
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007).
1'4 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 281 (1988) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
" Indeed, the Fraser Court began its analysis by reaffirming Tinker. See
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
'6 Id. at 683 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
167 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 683.
"5 See 484 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of divorce on students.169 The school administration prevented
either story from being included in a school newspaper.' 70 The
Court held that this school action was constitutional. 171
In so ruling, the Hazelwood Court further confused the
meaning of Tinker. Consider the Court's suggestion that the rule
from Tinker did not govern the case before it.' 72  It stated
that "the standard articulated in Tinker for determining
when a school may punish student expression need not also
be the standard for determining when a school may refuse
to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student
expression."7 3  According to Hazelwood, then, a different
standard than the one set forth in Tinker applies to student
expression "that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school." 174  Along similar lines, the Court asserted that the
analysis in Fraser was not the same as the analysis in Tinker.7 5
The Hazelwood Court further seemed to assume that, if Tinker
applied, it would require something other than a showing that
the student articles would disrupt the school's efforts to shape
the lessons students learned by writing for the paper, to ensure
the contents of the paper would not be too offensive for a school
setting, or to avoid any misunderstanding of the school's position
on the topics students addressed in the newspaper.' 76 After all, if
this kind of showing would suffice under Tinker, then the Court
had no need to go to the great lengths it did to distinguish
Tinker. Hazelwood thus implied that Tinker imposed a more
exacting test for the constitutionality of restrictions on student
speech than Fraser, and a more exacting test than the one by
which the Hazelwood Court itself was willing to abide. The
169 Id. at 263-64 (majority opinion).
170 Id. at 264.
171 Id. at 276.
172 See id. at 270.
173 Id. at 272-73.
174 Id. at 271.
175 See id. at 271 n.4.
176 Cf. id. at 282-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing three interests, which
presumably would not have sufficed to deny protection under Tinker, but which the
Court recognized as sufficient).
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Court did not identify, however, the way in which the Tinker test
was more exacting. If anything, then, Hazelwood further
muddied the test of Tinker.
177
The same is true for Hazelwood's treatment of Fraser;
Hazelwood provided an odd reading of Fraser, one that made it
more difficult to interpret. According to Hazelwood, key to the
situation before it, as well as to the one in Fraser, was that the
student speech at issue could reasonably be construed as being
endorsed by the school. 178 Thus, the Court reasoned that it had
held in Fraser that a student could be disciplined for having
delivered a speech that was "sexually explicit" but not legally
obscene at an official school assembly, because the school
was entitled to "disassociate itself" from the speech in a manner
that would demonstrate to others that such vulgarity is
"wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public
school education." 179
Moreover, the Court explained that a school's need to
disassociate itself from student expression meant that school
officials could suppress student speech for being "ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,
vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences."1 0
Hazelwood can be interpreted, then, as reading Fraser to
permit restrictions on student speech for a far greater range of
reasons than Fraser itself suggested. The school might be able
to punish a student speech outside of the classroom not only
because it is plainly offensive, but also because it is, say,
ungrammatical or biased. The Court in Fraser never suggested it
would have allowed a school to go so far.
An alternative interpretation of Hazelwood, however, is
formulating a different rule than Fraser for some free speech
cases. Under this view, Hazelwood involved speech bearing the
imprimatur of the school in a way that Fraser did not, and
177 For example, shortly after the Court issued its decision in Hazelwood, one
scholar explained the test this way: "Hazelwood, in contrast, reverses [Tinker's]
presumption [favoring student speech] by applying a deferential reasonableness
standard once the context of the speech has satisfied the education-related
definitional test[,] ... [which] the majority was not entirely consistent in
explaining...." Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School District and the Role
of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 695 (1988).
178 See Hazlewood, 484 U.S. at 272.
'7 Id. at 266-67 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-
86 (1986)).
180 Id. at 271.
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Hazelwood permitted greater latitude for schools to control
student speech bearing the school's imprimatur than either
Tinker or Fraser would allow.
This alternative understanding of Hazelwood permits a more
straightforward reading of Tinker and Fraser. But it gives rise to
problems of its own. On one hand, outside of the school setting,
courts often require government to use the least restrictive
means when censoring speech."8 ' It is not clear why the school in
Hazelwood could not "disassociate itself' from the student
articles without preventing their publication.8 2 As the dissent in
Hazelwood pointed out, the school could have required the paper
to publish a disclaimer making clear that the school did not agree
with-or even that it affirmatively disagreed with-the students'
articles. 18 3 Alternatively, the school could have written its own
response to the articles, explaining why they were wrong or
inappropriate, or otherwise were at odds with the views of school
officials."
Furthermore, after Hazelwood, it is similarly not clear what
student speech could not be reasonably attributed to the school.
If the prophylactic measures discussed above would not suffice to
separate the school in Hazelwood from student articles, then
similar concerns might well arise about a student's speech at a
school assembly (as Hazelwood suggested occurred in Fraser)8 5
or armbands that students wear to protest a war (as were at
issue in Tinker).8 6 Indeed, under an extreme view, a school's
acquiescence to student expression always gives rise to a form of
complicity, such that any student expression could potentially be
ascribed to the school itself. Under this view, school censorship
has no outer bounds. Hazelwood did little to suggest a limiting
principle for when student speech could not reasonably be
construed as bearing the imprimatur of the school. In light of
this confusion, some commentators understandably have
M8' See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 11.2.2, at 943-48, (discussing
overbreadth doctrine).
182 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
"13 Id. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184 Id.
185 See id. at 266-67 (majority opinion).
11 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
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abandoned the effort to develop a general rule from Hazelwood
and interpret the case simply as establishing an approach
specific to school newspapers. 187
4. Morse
Morse involved a school principal punishing a student
for displaying a banner that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"
on a public sidewalk during the Olympic torch ceremony.88
The Court upheld the principal's actions under the First
Amendment. 189 In so ruling, Morse provided its own analysis of
Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood. To a limited extent, that
analysis was straightforward. Morse thus noted that students
retain some free speech rights' 90 and also that those rights are
not necessarily the same as they would be outside of school.' 9 '
Beyond these general propositions, however, Morse further
confused this area of the law.192
In regard to Tinker, for example, Morse acknowledged the
general rule that schools cannot restrict student speech "unless
school officials reasonably conclude that it will 'materially and
187 See, e.g., John R. Craddock, Case Comment, The First Amendment Rights of
Public School Students Are Not Violated When School Officials Impose Reasonable
Editorial Control over the Content of School-Sponsored Publications: Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 30 S. TEX. L. REV. 193, 194 (1990) (explaining that
Hazelwood "held that school authorities can enforce prior restraints on [student]
publication[s]"); Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New
Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 64 n.8
(2008) (noting circuit split regarding whether Hazelwood applies beyond student
publications, including to a teacher's classroom speech).
" Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
189 Id. at 409-10.
190 Id. at 405-06.
191 Id.
11 Less than one year after Morse was decided, Lewis & Clark Law School
organized a symposium entitled Speech and the Public Schools After Morse v.
Frederick that drew commentary on the confused state of student free speech rights.
For example, in his paper, Professor Richard W. Garnett commented that Morse
"leaves unresolved many interesting and difficult problems," including the "'basic
educational mission' of public schools" and "the implications of this 'mission' for
officials' authority and students' free speech rights[.]" Richard W. Garnett, Can
There Really Be "Free Speech" in Public Schools?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45, 45
(2008); see also Laycock, supra note 5, at 112-13 (acknowledging that Morse failed to
provide any general principle as a basis for its decision but arguing that the absence
of such a principle was preferable to adoption of a broad principle that would
undermine Tinker).
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substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.' "9193
Morse, however, did not clarify what qualifies as "the work and
discipline" of a school or what level of interference counts as a
material and substantial "disruption." Worse yet, Morse simply
asserted, without explanation, that Fraser did not follow Tinker:
"Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not
conduct the 'substantial disruption' analysis prescribed in
Tinker."'04 By asserting that Fraser did not follow Tinker, Morse
seemed to assume that the "work and discipline" of a school does
not include student speeches during an assembly or that
lewd language used during those speeches is not sufficiently
disruptive to violate Tinker.'95  But Morse did not explain-or
even hint at-why this is so or what judgments are necessary in
deciding whether and how to apply Tinker.
Further, other than asserting that Fraser did not use the
same "mode of analysis" as Tinker, the Morse Court did not
clarify what "mode of analysis" Fraser did use.' 96 Indeed, Morse
seemed somewhat unsure whether Fraser permitted a restriction
on speech based on content (or, perhaps, even by point of view).
The Morse Court did specifically reject an understanding
of Fraser as allowing a school to proscribe any speech that
school officials find "plainly 'offensive.' "197 Any such rule, the
Court reasoned, could allow schools to restrict "political and
religious speech." 98 On what basis then, did Fraser permit the
school district to punish a student's "inappropriate" or "plainly
offensive" speech? Morse simply did not say.
Morse also left the rule from Hazelwood unclear. Morse
acknowledged that Hazelwood held that "school-sponsored"
speech may be subjected to particularly stringent regulation.'99
Hazelwood had indicated that this was not only true of the
student articles in the case before it but that it was also true of
the student speech at the assembly in Fraser.°° If a student's
193 Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)).
19 Id. at 405 (citation omitted). The Court similarly stated that Fraser did not
follow the same "mode of analysis" as Tinker. Id.
195 See id. at 403-05.
196 Id. at 404.
... Id. at 409.
198 Id.
19 Id. at 418.
200 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1988).
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comments in support of a candidate for a student office could
reasonably be attributed to the school, why wouldn't the same be
true of a banner unfurled by a student in front of school? Or
perhaps even of an armband? Morse provided no answers. The
Morse Court simply asserted that the rule from Hazelwood was
inapposite.2 10 As a result, Morse did not explain how the facts
before it would be resolved if Hazelwood applied.
Finally, the Morse Court announced what would appear
to be yet another rule for school speech cases: "The 'special
characteristics of the school environment,'.. . and the
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse ... allow
schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard
as promoting illegal drug use."202
According to Morse, this rule is consistent with Tinker
because illegal drug use gives rise to a "danger [that] is far
more serious and palpable" than any "abstract desire to avoid
controversy." 20 3 At the same time, the Morse Court perceived this
rule as not going as far as the broadest reading of Fraser, which
would allow a school to ban any student speech that is merely
"plainly 'offensive.' "204 Beyond this, the Morse Court did not
explain how its reasoning would apply in future cases.20 5
To see the resulting confusion, consider the task of
distinguishing speech that promotes drug use from speech that
argues in favor of drug legalization. These categories are not
mutually exclusive. Imagine a student who is listening to a
group of his classmates arguing about whether use of marijuana
should be legalized. He states that marijuana is more fun and
less harmful than caffeine. His statement could be construed as
'4 20promoting" use of marijuana. 06 Or it could be understood as a
point that figures in a larger argument, even one about possible
government action. How are courts to decide?
21 See Morse, 551 U.S.at 405.
202 Id. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
203 Id. at 408-09.
204 Id. at 409.
205 For a criticism of Morse on this basis, see Erwin Chemerinsky, How Will
Morse v. Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 17, 22-25 (2008).
201 Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.
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In the end, Morse leaves at least two fundamental questions
unanswered. The first is what the rule is from each of the four
school speech cases, including Morse itself. The second question
is which case applies to a given set of facts, assuming each case
stands for a separate rule. °7
B. Role of Government and the Functions Schools Perform
The key to making sense of the various school speech cases is
to recognize them as contending with a single common judgment
in somewhat distinct and somewhat overlapping contexts. The
judgment is about whether the school in each instance acts as a
patron or as a regulator. There are limits on the role of a school
as patron, limits which vary with the particular function a school
performs. In addition to acting as a speaker or sponsor, among
the less controversial tasks of the public school as proprietor are
conveying technical knowledge, maintaining order,20 8 ensuring
the safety of students,2 9 and controlling the curriculum.
21
More controversial tasks include protecting students from
obscene, lewd or offensive language, 21' and inculcating values
and behaviors in students.212 Attention to these functions-and
207 See Schauer, supra note 2, at 209, 219-22, 233 (noting that Morse failed to
provide meaningful guidance to future courts); accord Laycock, supra note 5, at
112-13.
208 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
209 Id.; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) ("[Alpart from
education, the school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence .... ").
210 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
211 Compare Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (indicating that schools may prohibit
"inappropriate" or "plainly offensive" speech), with Morse, 551 U.S. at 409, and
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (questioning Fraser as potentially allowing schools to impose
an impermissible political or religious orthodoxy).
212 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) ("[Tlhe state may do
much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically,
mentally and morally...."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925) ("[Clertain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught,
and.., nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare."); see
also Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and Viewpoint Discrimination in Public
Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 647, 651-54 (2005) (suggesting distinction between proper
inculcation of values and improper indoctrination); Stanley Ingber, Liberty and
Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 421, 443
(1995) (arguing that value transmission is an essential function of schools, but
indoctrination that is "too successful" is in tension with democratic ideals); Susan H.
Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free Speech Clause with
Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 769,
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to which ones each case implicates-casts light on the ways in
which the school cases are consistent and inconsistent.
From this perspective, Tinker appears as a case in which the
Court concluded that banning black antiwar armbands while
allowing students to don other political symbols was not a
legitimate managerial function of a school. Fraser and
Hazelwood, in contrast, can be understood as involving the
legitimate goals of, respectively, protecting students from lewd
expression and controlling the school curriculum (or, less
plausibly, both cases can be read as involving school-sponsored
speech). Understood in this way, the outcomes in Tinker, Fraser,
and Hazelwood may form a coherent whole.
Morse, however, is more difficult to reconcile with Tinker.
The most plausible account of Morse is that the Court allowed
the principal to silence Frederick to prevent him from interfering
with efforts to inculcate in students an aversion to the use of
illegal drugs. If this view is right, Morse permits schools to shape
student discussion in ways that Tinker suggested would be
impermissible-and, indeed, in ways that the Morse Court itself
at times appeared to disavow.
1. Tinker
Tinker did not focus on the distinction between government
acting as patron and regulator. But it can be understood in those
terms. The Court reasoned in effect that the school did not
perform a legitimate school function in banning the black
armbands but instead regulated student speech as private
citizens, triggering scrutiny under the First Amendment.213
As Tinker recognized, government in managing schools must
be able to maintain order in the classrooms,214 protect students
from violence,215 and perform various other tasks.216 It even
indicated that schools might be free to control student outfits,
hairdos, and general behavior and demeanor, noting that the
773 (1995) (attempting to reconcile the inculcative function with the marketplace of
ideas model, and arguing that inculcation of values will not violate the First
Amendment "if the values transmitted are those which will further the maintenance
of a civilized social order and promote democracy").
213 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
214 Id. at 513.
215 See id.
216 At least, Tinker did not foreclose dress codes, rules regarding deportment,
and the like. See id. at 507-08.
1083
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
case before it did not relate to the "regulation of the length of
skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deportment. 17 But
the Court held that a school cannot silence students' political
speech merely to avoid discomfort or uneasiness.218 Indeed, by
pointing out the adornments on clothing that the school in Tinker
allowed-including buttons from national campaigns and the
Iron Cross, a symbol of Nazism219- the Court appeared to be
buttressing its (unstated) conclusion that the school itself did not
actually believe that the school's educational role required
restrictions on wearing political symbols. The Court thus treated
the ban on armbands as akin to "a regulation.., forbidding
discussion of the Vietnam conflict, or the expression by any
student of opposition to it anywhere on school property except as
part of a prescribed classroom exercise."22° It is unsurprising,
then, that the Court determined that the ban as a regulation was
unconstitutional, given it appeared to impose an impermissible
political orthodoxy about the Vietnam War.
2. Fraser
A similar attention to the school function at issue in Fraser
yields two key points: first, the Court can be understood as
concluding that the school acted within its legitimate role as
patron, and therefore, did not violate the First Amendment; and,
second, Fraser involved a task which school administrators
should have leeway in performing, to wit, protecting students
from lewd speech.
To see this, consider the numerous potential rationales the
Court suggested for upholding the restriction on student speech:
(1) shaping the views ascribed to the school; 221 (2) protecting
217 Id.
21 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
219 See id. at 510.
22 Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
221 The Court indicated that the school's punishment of Fraser was an
appropriate means to "disassociate" the school from Fraser's message. Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986).
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students from vulgar and sexually explicit speech;222 and
(3) "inculcat[ing]" in students a commitment to "civil, mature"
debate.223
Not all of these rationales provided a plausible justification
for the school's actions. School officials were not themselves
speaking when Fraser gave his sexually provocative speech at a
school assembly. The Court suggested the possibility, however,
that the school sponsored the student speech.224 It noted that one
of the reasons the Court held a two-day suspension of Fraser was
constitutional was that the school could thereby "disassociate"
itself from his message.225  This interpretation would fit
comfortably within the framework we propose. The government
may ensure that the messages it sponsors are "neither garbled
nor distorted," as the Court put the point in Rosenberger.226
Still, the argument that the school sponsored Fraser's speech
is strained. The school had not directed students to convey any
particular message. It asked them, at most, to address a general
topic. 227 And what the students said on that topic was apparently
up to them within certain constraints, including the ones
imposed on Fraser.228 Perhaps for this reason, the Court itself
did not rely solely on this reasoning in upholding Fraser's
222 The Court implied that the First Amendment does not prevent schools from
protecting students-as children-from "plainly offensive," "sexually explicit," or
"vulgar and offensive" language. Id. at 683-84.
223 The Court at times noted that schools may restrict "plainly offensive" speech
in an effort to "inculcat[e]" in students the value of "civil, mature" debate. Id. at 683.
21 See id. at 685 (noting that a "high school assembly or classroom is no place
for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of
teenage students").
22 Id. at 685-86.
16 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
27 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (noting only constraint on speech was
appropriateness for school assembly).
22 See id. at 677. To be sure, the same was true in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991), where government directed recipients of its funds to address family
planning but not abortion. Id. at 193-94. Of course, many have argued the Court's
reasoning in Rust itself was unpersuasive. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, State-
Supported Speech, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1119, 1163-74 (1999); Subsidized Speech, 106
YALE L.J. 151, 172-75 (1996); David Cole, Essay, Beyond Unconstitutional
Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 683-749 (1992).
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punishment.229 Indeed, it did not assert that Fraser's speech was
sponsored by the school, merely that the school was justified in
attempting to "disassociate itself' from the speech.2 30
In any case, the Court explored various other justifications
for restricting student expression. Most notable-in part because
later courts have taken this to be a key holding of Fraser23'-is
that schools may protect students from vulgar and sexually
explicit speech.232 A school would perform this function not as a
speaker or sponsor of speech but as a manager of a school. The
Fraser Court characterized this function quite broadly at certain
points, suggesting that a school might be able to proscribe any
speech that is "inappropriate"233 or "plainly offensive."234 But a
narrower version of this reasoning is far easier to defend.
Schools must be able to prevent students from using sexually
explicit language. That is part of teaching etiquette to the
speaker and protecting the sensibilities of the listeners. And that
is true even when speech does not qualify as obscenity. What
may be needed in this regard is a children's menu version of
the obscenity doctrine, one that carves out certain forms of
expression from free speech protection in the school environment
and is tailored to the special needs of children, and varies with
their age. A doctrine along these lines would be possible without
modifying the approach Tinker put in place for speech that
offends because of political viewpoint. Protecting students from
sexual or lewd language can be seen as a function distinct from
preventing discomfort from political speech.
A final function the Court noted that a school may perform-
inculcating the values of civil, mature debate235 -is most
compelling as applied to sexual or lewd expression by students
but becomes troubling if applied to a larger, undefined category
of expression. The key challenge would be in fashioning a
limiting principle, without which much student speech could be
22 Also noteworthy is that the proposition that government may control speech
that it sponsors was not well-established until years after Fraser was decided in
1986, a process generally understood to have begun with the Court's decision in Rust
in 1991. See Corbin, supra note 70, at 612.
230 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
231 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2007).
See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-84.
2"Id. at 683.
Id.
2M Id.
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subject to sanctions. Schools could potentially proscribe a great
deal of speech in the name of teaching civility. Indeed, the Morse
majority questioned Fraser for this reason.236
Fraser, then, can be understood as explaining various ways
that the school acted in its legitimate role as patron, either as a
sponsor of speech or as a proprietor of a school. Viewing the case
from this perspective, Fraser appears different in important
respects from Tinker. Fraser may have involved sponsorship of
speech in a way that Tinker did not, although Fraser's reasoning
along these lines was unclear and not as persuasive as it might
be. More plausibly, Fraser involved language that was offensive
in a fundamentally different way than the armbands in Tinker-
because of its sexual content, not its political message. It makes
sense to give schools greater freedom to proscribe speech that is
lewd than speech that is politically provocative. Banning lewd
speech does not threaten to impose a narrowly partisan political
orthodoxy in the same way as prohibiting political speech
because of the reaction it may provoke.
3. Hazelwood
The outcome in Hazelwood can similarly be squared with
Tinker. Hazelwood can be understood as interpreting the
school's actions as falling within its legitimate role as patron and,
more specifically, as an exercise of the school's substantial
discretion to shape its educational curriculum.
The Hazelwood Court justified censorship of articles in
the school newspaper on pregnancy and divorce as serving
various "legitimate pedagogical concerns."23 7 In particular, it
recognized the school's needs: (1) to prevent any audience from
incorrectly ascribing student speech to the school; (2) to control
the curriculum; and (3) to protect an immature audience from
offensive speech.238
The distinction between patron and regulator casts light on
the Court's reasoning in Hazelwood. It can make sense, for
example, of the two categories of student speech the Court
identified-speech that the school tolerates and speech it
promotes. As the Court explained, "The question whether the
'3 Morse, 551 U.S. at 408-09.
"7 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
Id. at 271; see also id. at 282-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (addressing all
three of these possible justifications for the Court's decision).
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First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student
speech-the question that we addressed in Tinker-is different
from the question whether the First Amendment requires a
school affirmatively to promote particular student speech."239
This sounds very much like distinguishing, to use our terms, the
role of government as regulator from the role of government as
patron--or, more specifically, as sponsor. Indeed, the Court
characterized the distinction as between "speech that is
sponsored by the school and speech that is not."24 °
The dissent in Hazelwood characterized these categories as
without a basis in Supreme Court precedent, 41 but in fact, as we
have noted, they reflect part of the underlying structure of free
speech law. Government itself may express or sponsor speech
from a particular point of view.242 As the Court was later to
recognize in Rust and the cases that interpreted it (including
Rosenberger243 and Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez), 2" when
government sponsors speech, it may ensure that its message is
not garbled or distorted.
But if attention to the role of government as sponsor reveals
the reasoning in Hazelwood as consistent at a deep level with the
structure of free speech law, it also raises questions about the
application of that structure to the facts before the Court. A
tricky issue in Hazelwood, as in Fraser, was that the school did
not try to communicate its own message.245 It merely sought to
avoid being associated with a message that it did not want to
communicate. As the dissent pointed out, that task could be
accomplished by other means-by publishing a disclaimer or
even by expressing a view at odds with the content of the student
articles.246
29 Id. at 270-71 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
240 Id. at 271 n.3 (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
243 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832-33 (1995)
(characterizing holding from Rust v. Sullivan).
24 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (noting that although Rust was not framed in
terms of government speech, it has been interpreted to allow the government to
discriminate by viewpoint in awarding subsidies under some circumstances).
24 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (discussing Fraser and its holding that a
school could censor "student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational
mission'" (citations omitted)).
26 Id. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Part of the reason the Court may have strained to
characterize the school in Hazelwood as a sponsor of speech
is that it was hesitant to recognize the implications when
government acts as manager of a school-that a school as
manager, much like a school as sponsor, may restrict student
expression. Yet the Court did recognize the managerial functions
of the school at play in Hazelwood. In particular, the Court
justified the censorship as based not only on the need for the
school to disassociate itself from the student articles, but also on
the importance of the school controlling its own curriculum and
protecting the sensibilities of students. 247
The decision in Hazelwood is perhaps most defensible if the
school newspaper is viewed merely as part of the school's
curriculum. Teachers often direct students to write essays on
particular subjects and not on others. To be sure, the sort of
lesson the school imparted through its censorship was different
from the lessons schools usually teach in class. The Court
suggested that school officials were educating students about
responsible journalism, which included choosing appropriate
subject matter for school articles.248 One might debate whether
schools should be free to pursue a curriculum along these lines,
particularly in the context of a school newspaper. 249  But
understanding Hazelwood as addressing the permissible role of a
school in shaping its curriculum minimizes the tension between
that decision and the other school precedents.
Hazelwood is more troubling if interpreted as following
Fraser in allowing schools to protect student sensibilities.
Hazelwood suggested that the school needed to protect students
from speech "unsuitable for immature audiences."25 ° But if this
aspect of Hazelwood is taken seriously, it comes very close to
conflicting with Tinker. After all, protecting students from lewd
or sexual speech, as the Court arguably did in Fraser, is one
matter. Preventing students from addressing important and
difficult topics is another, one that threatens to cross the line into
a narrow political orthodoxy. Indeed, it is not clear why
discussion of divorce or pregnancy would upset student
sensibilities in a different way than protesting a war.
247 Id. at 271 (majority opinion).
248 Id. at 267-70.
249 Id. at 290-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 271 (majority opinion).
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Hazelwood's implication that schools may suppress any student
speech they deem unsuitable for children could give great leeway
to school administrators to suppress student expression on all
sorts of controversial topics, particularly if they disagree with
what students are saying.
Much like Fraser, then, Hazelwood may well be consistent
with Tinker, depending on the function the school was
performing. In particular, if the school newspaper was indeed
part of the school curriculum, then the Court's acceptance of the
school's exercise of control over its content is unsurprising.
4. Morse
Morse, too, confirms the distinction we have drawn between
a school acting as patron and regulator. But attention to specific
school functions reveals the decision is in tension with Tinker.
The two cases appear to take inconsistent views of the limits of a
school's legitimate role as patron.
Most of the school functions potentially at play in Tinker,
Fraser, and Hazelwood have no bearing on the school's
punishment of Frederick for displaying his "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS" banner.2 51 The school in Morse was not attempting to
speak or sponsor Frederick's speech. As the Court acknowledged,
there was little likelihood that an observer would believe that
Frederick's banner bore the imprimatur of the school.25 2 Nor was
the school attempting to teach a particular lesson, so control over
the curriculum in any ordinary sense was not at issue. In
addition, the banner was not lewd or sexual. And it was not
offensive in a way that warranted censorship, or at least the
majority disavowed any such explanation for its decision.253
One legitimate function the school in Morse might be
understood to have undertaken was protecting students. Justice
Alito (joined by Justice Kennedy) argued in a concurring opinion
that drugs pose a threat in much the same way as violence.254
For this reason, he claimed Principal Morse's actions were
justified as an early intervention to protect "the physical safety of
251 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
252 Id. at 405.
25 The Court made no claim that that aspect of Fraser governed the case. To the
contrary, it expressed doubt that schools could prohibit all student expression that is
"plainly offensive" or "inappropriate." Id. at 409.
25 Id. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring).
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students." 25 But the Morse majority did not rely on this line of
reasoning-and this position as applied to the facts of the case
was implausible. As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, a
cryptic banner that could be interpreted as possibly favoring
drugs would be quite unlikely to increase student drug use.
256
A couple of other possible functions that schools play seem
more relevant. The first is maintaining discipline. Principal
Morse's failure to act could have undermined the authority of
school officials, compromising her control over raucous student
behavior in general. The primary problem with this line of
analysis is that it is hard to square with Principal Morse's actual
decision-making process. One might think that a banner-
particularly an apparently nonsensical one-would be just as
provocative if it were vaguely antidrug. Yet Principal Morse
acknowledged that she objected to Frederick's banner only
because she interpreted it as favoring drug use.257
We are left then-if in part by a process of elimination-with
the understanding that Morse holds that schools may inculcate
certain values in students, including a rejection of illegal drugs,
and that they may do so by suppressing student speech that
would interfere with that effort. The notion that schools can, and
necessarily do, inculcate some values in addition to conveying
substantive knowledge is plausible. 28 The problem with Morse,
though, is its failure to specify the values that schools may
inculcate or the means by which schools may inculcate them.
This omission gives rise to a tension between Morse and
other free speech decisions. Indeed, the Court itself indicated
that free speech doctrine does not permit a public school to
proscribe "political and religious speech."259  That view would
seem to be consistent with a broader principle under the First
Amendment at play in Pico and Tinker-that government cannot
impose a narrow orthodoxy along political lines.
260
255 Id. at 424-25.
256 Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25, Id. at 401 (majority opinion).
258 See CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 193 (quoting Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).
259 Morse, 551 U.S. at 409.
260 Perhaps the most famous statement of this principle comes from West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
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But what of a message that encourages drug use (or at least
makes light of the issue) and also expresses a religious and
political message? One need not search long for an example. If
Frederick's message could reasonably be construed as favoring
illegal drugs, it also could similarly reasonably be read as
religious-it did, after all, invoke Jesus-and as political-
promoting the legalization of marijuana, a hot political issue in
Alaska at the time.261
The Court did not address these difficulties. Nor did it make
clear what the underlying principle was for its decision in a way
that would guide future courts. It did assert that "deterring
drug use by schoolchildren is an 'important-indeed, perhaps
compelling' interest."262 But that claim suggests other possible
grounds for censoring students. Preventing alcohol use is also
important, as is preventing injuries on sports fields. For that
matter, so is encouraging students to go to college. Does that
mean a school could punish student expression that could
reasonably be construed as encouraging students to use alcohol,
to be overly aggressive in school athletics, or to drop out of high
school? The failure of the Court to provide a principled basis for
its decision caused Justice Stevens to worry that the same rule
might extend quite far, applying not only to student expression
encouraging use of drugs but, indeed, also to expression
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
Id. at 642. Imposing such an orthodox view by restricting student speech should run
afoul of the Free Speech Clause. It also might violate other provisions of the
Constitution, including the Establishment Clause (if the orthodoxy were religious)
and students' substantive due process rights (if, for example, it involved a ban on
teaching German in school). For an excellent discussion of the synergy between
different constitutional rights in this context, see EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note
95, at 192-97, for a discussion ofEpperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), Board of
Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
among other cases, and compare with Laycock, supra note 5, for a suggestion that
such conduct might not violate the Constitution "because there is no political
Establishment Clause," id. at 119-20, a position difficult to reconcile with Pico.
261 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 446 n.8 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 407 (majority opinion) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
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encouraging a broad range of undesirable behavior, including use
of alcohol.263 Similarly, Justice Breyer had difficulty accepting
this "sui generis" approach to drugs.264
Understood in this way, Morse confirms key aspects of the
inherent structure of free speech law that we have attempted to
describe. It reveals that government as proprietor of a school
may discriminate by point of view in suppressing student
expression. And it similarly shows that government may restrict
student expression not only as a speaker and a sponsor of speech,
but also as manager of a school.265 Indeed, of the four school
speech cases, only Morse upheld a viewpoint-based restriction on
student expression without so much as a suggestion that the
student speech might be ascribed to the school. These are
important points for understanding free speech law.
But attention to the role of government-and to the
particular functions it serves-also reveals why Morse is
disturbing. This is so for at least two related reasons. First,
Morse's failure to situate its analysis within a broader doctrinal
framework means that it provides only limited guidance for
future cases. The holding of Morse itself is unclear. And its
reasoning makes it more difficult for courts to understand the
holdings from Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood, or to decide which
of those cases should govern a particular set of facts. Second, the
Court's conclusion that Principal Morse remained within the
bounds of the First Amendment is questionable, and the Court's
failure to explain its reasoning in arriving at that conclusion sets
a confusing-and perhaps dangerous-precedent. To be sure,
schools may promote a particular point of view on some issues
and may suppress student speech under some circumstances.
Those powers, however, are circumscribed by the Free Speech
Clause, and the Court would have done well to suggest their
outer limits and explain why punishing Frederick did not exceed
them.
26 See id. at 446 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26 See id. at 426 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
26 See id. at 436-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
opinion "trivializes the two cardinal principles upon which Tinker rests"-censorship
based "on the viewpoint of the speaker" and "when the advocacy is likely to provoke
the harm that the government seeks to avoid").
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In sum, Morse appears to grant schools a license to inculcate
values-and to silent student speech that might interfere with
that effort-in a way that none of the earlier school speech cases
suggested was permissible. Only time will tell whether this
license applies only to student speech that may encourage illegal
use of drugs or if it extends much further.
C. Deference to School Officials.
Focusing on the role of government-and on the particular
functions that schools perform-can also highlight consistencies
and inconsistencies in the school speech cases. These include the
Court's apparent change of position on whether judges should
defer to school officials.
A range of options is available regarding deference. Courts,
in effect, could assume the position of school officials, drawing
the line between permissible and impermissible curtailments of
student speech based on their own view of the competing
interests at play.266 In other words, courts could choose to show
no deference at all to the judgment of school officials.
Considerations in favor of this approach are that judges are
particularly skilled at interpreting free speech doctrine, school
officials may be too sympathetic to the needs of administrative
convenience and discipline to honor students' First Amendment
rights, and that school officials may be influenced-even
subconsciously-by hostility to some political or religious views.
But there are reasons for courts to show some deference as
well.267  First, school officials may have greater expertise than
judges at assessing the educational and related needs of students
and the impact student speech can have on those needs.268
Second, judicial scrutiny of school decisions may itself interfere
266 This is the approach the Court appeared to take in Tinker, in which the
Court showed no deference to school officials. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969).
267 The Court suggested such deference is appropriate to school officials in Bethel
School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986), Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267, 276 (1988), and Morse, 551 U.S. at 409-10 (deferring
to reasonable belief of school principal).
268 Justice O'Connor recognized that deference may be appropriate to the
expertise of school officials in a way relevant to constitutional interpretation in
Grutter. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003) (deferring to the
University of Michigan Law School's expertise regarding the benefits of diversity to
legal education).
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with their effective operation. 69 If students were to challenge in
court every decision of a school official to abridge student
expression-and if courts were to show no deference whatsoever
to school officials-serious harm might occur to the efficient and
effective administration of education. Judges might have to
assess, for example, whether a student's snapping of chewing
gum during class was in fact disrespectful or instead was a
way of expressing appropriate skepticism of another student's
comment, a method of communication the teacher may not have
prohibited in every instance. A difficult issue is separating out
those instances where deference is appropriate from those where
it is not.
Tinker showed no deference to school officials. Instead, the
Court took it upon itself to assess whether the armbands would
disrupt the work or discipline of the school and decided they
would not.2 70  Fraser, in contrast, suggested that authority to
decide the range of permissible student speech lay in the first
instance with school officials, not with the federal courts: "The
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school
board."271 Hazelwood,27 2 and Morse273 adopted the same view on
this matter as Fraser.
The cases, however, may not be at odds to quite the extent as
it at first appears. Whether a court should defer depends
on context. From this perspective, the justifications for
giving officials discretion in Tinker were not compelling. Tinker
confronted suppression of speech based on an anticipated
reaction to a particular political point of view, expressed in a
manner that the school had generally permitted. There was even
the possibility that the school would have allowed students to
express the opposite view in a similar way, that is, the wearing of
269 Professor Post makes this point in describing the judicial role in
distinguishing patron from regulator-what he would call governance from
management-under the public forum doctrine. See Between Governance and
Management, supra note 17, at 1809-24; see also Garnett, supra note 92, at 50-51
(discussing Post's distinction among other views attentive to institutional context).
270 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14.
27 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
272 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683); see id. at 276.
273 This deference is manifest in the Court's holding that restrictions are
permissible on student expression that a school official "reasonably believes"
promotes drug use-even ifit does not in fact promote drug use, as was arguably the
case in Morse itself. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409-10 (2007).
1095
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
a symbol in favor of the war.274 No reason exists to think school
officials are uniquely skilled at predicting the consequences
of political commentary, and substantial reason exists to believe
their own ideological commitments would color their decision-
making. Moreover, restrictions on expression to avoid politically
motivated conflict should be rare enough that judicial scrutiny
should not disrupt the daily life of schools. Given the risk that a
school might use this rationale to impose an impermissible
political orthodoxy and the limited need for schools to impose this
sort of restriction, lack of judicial deference to school officials in
Tinker was appropriate.
The circumstances in Fraser were quite different. Teachers
and school administrators are likely to have greater expertise
than judges regarding appropriate language for students of
various ages. And teachers and administrators need leeway in
imposing correlative limits. It would simply be impractical for
the judiciary to oversee the decisions of teachers regarding which
sexual words, phrases, and metaphors students may use in
particular settings. And it seems relatively unlikely that the
school officials intervened for impermissible reasons in Fraser.
The plaintiff provided no reason to doubt that they were
concerned about his lewd language and did not have some other
hidden agenda. Deference, therefore, was in order.
Hazelwood is more difficult. Ambiguity in the Court's
reasoning makes it particularly challenging to assess the
deference the Court showed to school officials. If, in fact, the
Court was of the view that the school sponsored the student
speech-that the newspaper was communicating a message on
behalf of the school-then the notion of deference may understate
the latitude of the school. Following Rust,275 school officials were
free to communicate a broad range of messages, even on highly
controversial political issues like abortion,276 pregnancy, and
divorce. The Hazelwood Court did not indicate that it was
willing to go this far, which makes one wonder whether it fully
believed the school was sponsoring the student speech.
274 After all, the school allowed students to wear the Nazi Iron Cross. Tinker,
393 U.S. at 510.
27. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-200 (1991).
276 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
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Alternatively, if the school newspaper was part of the
curriculum-much like a class on journalism-then deference
made sense. School officials have greater insight about what a
school should and should not teach, and second guessing by
courts could wreak havoc. Indeed, perhaps for these reasons,
Justice Brennan in Pico suggested that schools may have
unfettered discretion in shaping their curriculum.Y
7
Of course, a school newspaper might be considered a setting
in which students are free to express their own views, as the
dissent in Hazelwood argued. 7 8  And a school's refusal to let
students address divorce and teen pregnancy might well be based
on how officials view the topic and whether they disagree with
the perspectives student articles appear to express. Still,
assuming-as the majority in Hazelwood concluded-that the
school controlled the newspaper much as it would a class, then
the deference it showed was appropriate.
Thus, Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood are not necessarily
in disagreement about whether courts should defer to school
officials in applying the First Amendment. The opinions can be
explained as tailoring the level of judicial deference to the school
function at issue.
The same is not true for Morse. Morse, unlike Fraser, did not
involve lewd speech. Unlike Hazelwood, it did not implicate the
school curriculum. Instead, Morse appears to be based on school
officials inculcating antidrug values and silencing student speech
that might interfere with that effort, even speech that might
have a religious or political dimension. This is an odd setting for
the Court to defer. School officials would not appear to have any
special expertise in interpreting Frederick's banner. And it
would seem that courts could assess the principal's actions
without disrupting the activities of a school; students do not
display banners at televised events on any regular basis. Finally,
and perhaps most important, school officials might well be
influenced by their own religious or political views to interpret
student speech not based on its risk of encouraging drug use, but
based on their sympathies to the views students express. One
would not expect the Court to show deference to school officials in
this setting, just as it did not show deference in Tinker. Indeed,
277 See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982).
27 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 290-91 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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even the Morse Court itself expressed concern about officials
interfering with student expression on religious or political
grounds.279 Morse then appears to impede any effort to explain
the school speech cases as consistent on when school officials are
entitled to deference in censoring students.
D. Choosing Among the Rules
Beyond the difficulty of applying the rules from Tinker,
Fraser, Hazelwood, or Morse, there is the challenge of deciding
which of those rules governs a particular case. Morse provided
paltry guidance in this regard. According to Morse, Fraser and
Hazelwood did not apply the Tinker "mode of analysis," even if
neither Fraser nor Hazelwood makes clear when an alternative
mode of analysis is appropriate. But Morse itself did not say
when courts should set aside the rule from Tinker.8 ° What
seems to be missing is a way of framing the issues so that courts
can decide which of the rules the Court has articulated applies to
a particular case.
Focus on the role of government can clarify how courts
should choose among the different free speech rules. Each
narrow rule can then be understood as a different means to
address the limits on government's role as patron in a particular
setting. A school should, for example, have a relatively large
degree of leeway in controlling the curriculum that it will
teach.28 1 Hazelwood makes sense in these terms.
In contrast, one would expect schools to have much less
discretion in proscribing political speech out of concern for the
reaction it might provoke, as in Tinker. The risk is too high of a
school imposing an unacceptable orthodoxy on students as
private citizens. Thus, a school would likely run afoul of the
First Amendment if it prohibited a discussion of astrology in the
cafeteria because it would undermine efforts to have students
come to understand and respect the scientific method and
empiricism. A school generally performs different functions in
279 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 409.
2" Professor Douglas Laycock points out one possible way to organize the
decisions, a way that he does not endorse: "A legal realist might look at these same
cases and say that the rule is broad judicial deference to school officials, with a
Tinker exception that protects political speech." Laycock, supra note 5, at 112.
21 The Brennan plurality in Pico went so far as to suggest that in these
curricular matters, school officials might have unfettered discretion. Pico, 457 U.S.
at 869. As noted above, that seems an overstatement.
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the classroom and the cafeteria, and, as a result, free speech
doctrine constrains school officials to a different extent in those
settings.
The school cases-with the possible exception of Morse-thus
provide the outlines of a possible coherent approach to free
speech in the public schools, one that varies the rule depending
on the educational function at issue.
E. Scope: Applying Ordinary Free Speech Rules to Schools
Another challenge is to determine the relevance of
conventional free speech doctrine to school speech cases. This
difficulty can take various forms: (1) locating the boundary
between the school setting and the public realm; (2) applying
the public forum doctrine; (3) assessing the permissibility of
viewpoint discrimination; and (4) deciding whether a harm is
sufficiently imminent to warrant a restriction on expression.
Attention to role of government can help in each of these
settings.
1. School Boundaries and Role of Government
Courts currently tend to address whether a restriction on
speech has occurred within the public school setting-and
whether the special rules for student speech, therefore, apply-as
a single determination that applies for all purposes.28 2 But
attention to the role of government-and the more specific
functions it performs as part of that role-can allow for more
predictable and sensible outcomes.
Morse illustrates the benefits that could accrue from this
approach. The first issue the Court had to address was whether
the facts before the Court gave rise to "a school speech case" at
all.283 The Court dealt with this issue summarily. It set forth
several facts that it asserted resolved the matter: students
attended the event in Morse during school hours; the school
282 Morse is typical in this regard-it indicated that Frederick's banner was
school speech in general, not merely for some purposes (for example, protecting
students from violence) but not for others (for example, school control over the
curriculum). Morse, 551 U.S. at 400-01.
283 Id. at 400. For a discussion of the significance of this issue-despite the
Court's failure to address it at length-see Sonja R. West, Sanctionable Conduct:
How the Supreme Court Stealthily Opened the Schoolhouse Gate, 12 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 27 (2008).
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sponsored the event; "[tleachers and administrators were
interspersed among the students and charged with supervising
them;" "[tihe high school band and cheerleaders performed;" and
Frederick was standing among students and unfurled his banner
across the street from the school, making it visible to most
students.2s8 Taken together, the Court concluded that these
circumstances led to the conclusion that Frederick's expression
qualified as student speech.28 5
A different interpretation of the facts in Morse is possible, an
interpretation that Frederick argued before the Court. First,
Frederick did not go to school before the event, as the school
required, but rather traveled directly from his home to the public
sidewalk opposite the school, just as other members of the public
had.286 Second, he was not standing on school property.28 7
Indeed, his decision to stand on the sidewalk opposite the school
put him further away from the school grounds and was not
necessarily designed to display his banner to students. Third,
Frederick and his friends, not all of whom attended his
high school, did not unfurl their banner until the Olympic
torch approached, accompanied by cameramen, suggesting that
television viewers and not high school students were his intended
audience.288 Fourth, the school provided only loose supervision of
the event, and many students chose, instead of attending, to
leave for the day.289 These facts weigh in favor of the conclusion
that when Frederick revealed his controversial message, he was
expressing himself as a citizen at large on a public sidewalk, not
as a student at school.
But the point is not to contest the conclusion of the Court. It
does seem possible-if less certain than the Court asserted-that
Frederick's banner should be treated as student speech. The
point, instead, is that the Court's failure to clarify the rationale
behind its placement of the boundary of "school speech" will only
perpetuate existing confusion in the lower courts. This confusion
24 Morse, 551 U.S. at 401.
285 Id.
28 West, supra note 283, at 30; see also Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115
(9th Cir. 2006) (noting that Frederick did not make it to school because his car was
stuck in the snow in his driveway), rev'd, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
1 West, supra note 283, at 29.
1 Frederick claimed "that the words were just nonsense meant to attract
television cameras." Morse, 439 F.3d at 1117-18.
' West, supra note 283, at 30-31.
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is symptomatic of a kind of aimless formalism that plagues free
speech doctrine in the school setting-and, indeed, in other
contexts as well.
A better approach would be to focus on the role that school
officials play when they restrict student expression and,
specifically, on the particular function or functions they perform.
To see this, consider the clumsiness of the Court's general
conclusion that Morse was a "school speech case."290 If Principal
Morse had punished Frederick for purportedly disrupting the
school's curriculum, for example, it would be odd for the Court to
conclude that his expression was within the school setting for
that purpose. The school was not seeking to teach a specific
lesson. On the other hand, school administrators almost
certainly would be acting within their school roles in taking
action to prevent imminent violence between students at an
event like the one in Morse. If students were shouting epithets
and gesturing threateningly at one another as the Olympic torch
approached, the administrators could intervene to avoid an
altercation.291
From this perspective, the Court's reasoning in Morse was
less than satisfactory. It never made clear precisely what
educational function or functions Principal Morse fulfilled in
punishing Frederick. As discussed above, the most likely
candidate seems to be preventing Frederick from undermining
the school's efforts to inculcate in students an antidrug attitude.
This basis for restricting student speech would appear to be at
the margins of permissible government conduct as a patron, even
if it were clearly within a school setting-Alito, although using
different reasoning, placed Principal Morse's conduct at the "far
reaches" 292 permitted by the First Amendment, and Justice
Stevens placed it beyond those far reaches. 293  But inculcating
values by suppressing student speech seems like the kind of
school function that should not extend to students expressing
their own views on a public sidewalk. The risk that the school
I9 Morse, 551 U.S. at 400. In this way, the Court in Morse lost its bearings in a
manner similar to its decisions applying the public forum doctrine. See infra notes
309-313 and accompanying text. In both contexts, the Court has engaged in a
wooden analysis because it failed to recognize that the ultimate issue is whether
government acts as patron or regulator.
291 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring).
292Id.
I Id. at 434 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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would interfere with students' ability to engage in political
debate as private citizens-which the majority itself indicated
would be impermissible294 -is at its apogee beyond the school
grounds. At the least, the Court's opinion would have benefited
from making its reasoning explicit on this point. More generally,
the analysis of whether a court is addressing a "school speech"
case would make more sense if it attended to the particular
function or functions school officials are performing and the
propriety of their doing so in the relevant context.
2. The Public Forum Doctrine and Role of Government
Beyond determining the outer boundary of the school setting
for applying special free speech rules, another challenge is
reconciling the school rules for speech with the public forum
doctrine. This challenge arose in Hazelwood as a result of the
school's decision not to publish student articles on abortion and
divorce.295 If the school newspaper had been a public forum, then
arguably the Court should have subjected the school's decision to
heightened scrutiny.296
In deciding that the school newspaper was not a public
forum,29 v the majority in Hazelwood seemed to focus on the intent
of the school-in particular its pedagogical goals-in running the
newspaper. According to the majority, the school in Hazelwood
used the school newspaper merely as an extension of its ordinary
curriculum and provided ongoing monitoring of the student
publication.298 The educational goals of the newspaper included
teaching students "the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions
imposed upon journalists within the school community."299 These
goals, the majority reasoned, defined the permissible restrictions
on student speech and permitted the school to refuse to publish
the student articles. °°
294 See id. at 402-03 (majority opinion).
295 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).
296 See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992); see also Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
297 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
298 See id. at 267-70.
Id. at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted).
300 See id. at 270.
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On this issue, Justice Brennan pointed out that the
educational goals of the newspaper arose in part from student
"accept[ance] [of] all rights implied by the First Amendment."301
He reasoned that a key lesson to be learned through the
newspaper was about the right to free speech itself, and
therefore, that the school could not refuse to publish the articles
at issue.0 2
Neither the majority nor the dissent, however, explained
whether it was applying the ordinary version of the public forum
doctrine or whether it was adapting that doctrine to the school
setting in some way.
Attention to the role of government can clarify how to apply
the public forum doctrine in the public school setting. Indeed, it
unifies what otherwise appear to be disparate doctrinal areas.
According to our view of the inherent structure of free speech
law, the public forum doctrine is merely a way to assess the role
of government. 3  The determination that government has
created a public forum is a way of saying that government
restrictions on speech involve government regulating-as
opposed to acting as patron-and the remaining steps in the free
speech analysis then apply.0 4
Defining the role of government in the school context-as
with public forum cases in general-will depend in part on how
government defines its own mission and in part on the
irreducible obligations built into the First Amendment. 5 In
general, government has significant leeway to define its mission
as it chooses, but the choices it makes may give rise to free
speech rights. Thus, government may use public land in many
ways but if it creates a forum for free discussion-if it decides, for
example, to build a public street-the restrictions on expression
it may impose are limited. 6
A similar analysis applies to public schools. A school has
substantial discretion in defining its own mission, but the
decisions it makes can have implications for the Free Speech
301 Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
' See id. at 290-91.
303 See CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 199-267 (discussing the
role of government and the public forum doctrine).
" See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267-70 (discussing public forum doctrine).
305 See CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 199-267 (making this
argument).
" Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
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Clause. Thus, the school in Tinker likely could have imposed a
school uniform and banned all adorning symbols; 3 7 however,
once it allowed students control over their dress, it could not then
prohibit armbands that protested the Vietnam War. Although
the phrasing is awkward, the school's decision in Tinker to allow
students to choose their own dress created a kind of public
forum.0 8 Or, to put the matter in our terms, in light of the
school's decision not to impose a dress code as a patron, its ban
on black armbands was a form of regulation.
Understood in this light, the public forum doctrine and the
rules governing speech in public schools work toward the same
end: defining the role of government. Courts tend to lose sight
of the key judgment in both settings. They often assess a
particular government property or institution-a public airport,
for instance309-as if it were a public forum or not a public forum
for all purposes. 10 So, for example, streets and parks are
generally treated as public forums 311 but interschool mail
systems are not.312 This clumsy formalism parallels the Court's
misstep in Morse. In both settings, courts would do better to
focus on the particular government functions at issue and the
limits the Free Speech Clause places on those functions. 13
"I See Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 422 (9th Cir. 2008)
(upholding public school imposition of mandatory dress policy).
108 But the phrasing is no more awkward than, say, discussing whether a library
allowing-and limiting-access to computers constitutes a public forum. See United
States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003).
'09 See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674
(1992).
310 See id. at 680. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 11.4.2.1-.2, at
1126-27.
To be sure, courts have not been consistent in how they identify a public forum. See,
e.g., id. § 11.4.2.5, at 1143-44 (describing the difficulty of characterizing a forum as
public vel non). At times they have looked to the historical use of a particular kind of
forum, see, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 680-81, the access sought by the speaker, see, e.g.,
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801-02 (1985), the
function being served by a restriction on speech, see, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n., 539
U.S. at 205, or the intent of the government in restricting expression. See, e.g., Bd. of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-71 (1982) (ignoring traditional forum analysis in
favor of focus on intent of government).
"' See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 11.4.2.1-.2, at 1126-27.
312 See id. § 11.4.2.1, at 1126-27 (discussing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators'Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)).
313 Robert Post makes a similar point. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS,
supra note 17, at 199-266.
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3. Viewpoint Discrimination
There are other ambiguities regarding whether the line
between the rules for school and nonschool speech is permeable.
This is so because the Court has suggested at times that various
ordinary free speech rules may apply in the school setting, albeit
possibly in modified form. This is true, for example, of the
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination.
Consider the Court's famous assertion in R.A. V. v. City of
St. Paul314 that viewpoint discrimination is impermissible for
restrictions on any kind of expression, even unprotected
speech.315 Yet the principal in Morse acknowledged that she
confiscated Frederick's banner and punished him in part based
on his point of view. 16 Indeed, Morse articulated a new rule that
on its face is not viewpoint neutral-a school may proscribe
student speech that promotes drug use.317 Nothing in the Court's
reasoning suggests that a school may similarly prohibit speech
from a different point of view, student speech that, for example,
discourages drug use.
A further indication that the Court would permit viewpoint
discrimination is the majority's response to Justice Stevens's
dissent on this issue. The Court stated, "Although accusing this
decision of doing 'serious violence to the First Amendment' by
authorizing 'viewpoint discrimination,'.. . the dissent concludes
that 'it might well be appropriate to tolerate some targeted
viewpoint discrimination in this unique setting.' "318 It is
conspicuous that the Court did not deny that the new rule it
articulated allowed schools to discriminate by point of view.
Rather, the majority pointed out that even Justice Stevens, in his
dissent, acknowledged that schools may sometimes engage in
viewpoint discrimination.3 1 9
On the other hand, the Court indicated that schools cannot
proscribe "political and religious speech" merely because it is
"plainly offensive. "32 The Court, then, did not intend to allow
discrimination in regard to student speech based on a political or
314 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
315 See id. at 383-84.
316 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-98 (2007).
317 See id. at 408.
318 Id. at 409 (citations omitted).
319 Id.
320 Id.
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religious perspective, an approach consistent with Pico32 1 and
Tinker.22 A school policy would presumably run afoul of the
First Amendment if it permitted, for example, arguments
against-but not for-the legalization of marijuana, even though
the school could no doubt proscribe all talk of drug policy during
a class on Shakespeare.
The boundaries of the school environment, then, may be
somewhat permeable. In other words, sometimes schools may
discriminate by point of view and sometimes they may not.
Understandably, this state of affairs has confounded courts.2 3
Focusing on the role of government-and on the functions it
performs within that role-can help to explain the consequences
of the judgment that a school acts as patron. If it does, restraints
on speech generally are constitutional even if they discriminate
by point of view. This does not mean that there is no place for
consideration of viewpoint discrimination in the analysis.
Depending on the context, viewpoint discrimination may provide
evidence that the school has exceeded its permissible role as
patron-that it has acted, for example, on pretext.
In general, viewpoint discrimination in restricting student
speech is constitutional if a school acts as patron in a way that
the Constitution allows. As speaker or sponsor, the school may
take a position on various issues. It can disseminate a message
to discourage the use of illegal drugs or sexual promiscuity.
3 24
Similarly, a school can encourage students to promote a similar
message along these lines. Further, a school as proprietor, in its
role as educator, can take a position on all sorts of factual
topics-from science to history to the structure of our political
system 325 -even though students would have a right as private
citizens to assert views, even absurd views, contrary to the school
curriculum. This must be true or schools would not be able to
321 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-71 (1982).
322 Tinker v. DesMoines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969)
(criticizing school for allowing symbols of some political perspectives but not others).
323 See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 187, at 64 n.9 (noting circuit split regarding
whether schools may engage in viewpoint discrimination for speech that they
sponsor).
324 For a useful discussion of the law in this area-and its uncertainty-see
Laycock, supra note 5, at 117-20.
325 Pico, 457 U.S. at 869, 869-70 (suggesting that schools may have unfettered
discretion about curriculum).
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operate; any topic that a school teaches could potentially be the
source of a disagreement that is ultimately of a political
nature.326
Schools do not, however, have limitless discretion in
formulating their curricula. At some point, a school may cross
the line into imposing orthodox views on political or religious
matters. The right answers on a final examination, for example,
could not require students to adopt as their own the economic
policies of the national platform of the Republican or Democratic
Party. That would exceed the bounds of a school's permissible
role as patron.327
A similar analysis can apply to any function a school
performs. Each has an outer boundary defined by the
Constitution. In marking that boundary, viewpoint
discrimination often plays a useful part. It can, for example,
indicate that school officials acted on pretext and have moved
beyond the permissible role of a school as patron.
A school may, for example, impose a school uniform.2 But if
a school adopted a dress code that prohibited black armbands but
permitted students to don a symbol in favor of the Vietnam War,
such viewpoint discrimination would suggest that the school was
really attempting to prevent expression of one side of a political
debate, imposing the kind of orthodox view that the First
326 Even the method of presenting information may further a chosen viewpoint,
for "teachers often do not present the informational and normative content as being
merely one of a number of conceivable alternative views of an issue or question."
Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free
Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 62, 65 (2002). Redish and Finnerty further note that "the authoritarian
figure in the classroom will usually determine which viewpoint is 'correct,' and
students may be expected to provide those 'correct' answers on tests, at the risk of
failing if they do not." Id.
327 Courts have recognized this point at times, although they seem unsure about
its significance. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 599
n.3 (1998) (noting that government could not constitutionally fund organization
devoted to promoting Republican candidates, although suggesting it is not the First
Amendment that imposes this constraint-without explaining which constitutional
provision would be applicable); Pico, 457 U.S. at 868-71 (noting that school cannot
remove library books in favor of Republicans or in favor of racial equality but
suggesting that school control over the curriculum may be unfettered); cf. Laycock,
supra note 5, at 119-20 (suggesting that such conduct might not violate the
Constitution "because there is no political Establishment Clause," a position difficult
to reconcile with Pico).
328 See Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 441-42 (9th Cir. 2008)
(upholding public school imposition of mandatory dress policy).
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Amendment does not allow. 329  The Court's concern about
viewpoint discrimination in Tinker was a variation on this
principle. 3 0
Fraser similarly offers an opportunity to note the role
viewpoint discrimination does-and does not play-in assessing
the constitutionality of restraints on expression. Fraser
authorized punishment of lewd speech, 331 but it did not similarly
allow punishment of nonlewd speech. Arguably, that is a form of
viewpoint discrimination. If so, that does not matter. It is
discrimination consistent with a function the Court held schools
may perform-protecting students from lewd expression. In
contrast, if, for example, the school officials in Fraser had
punished Fraser's sexual metaphor because he favored one
candidate-if, say, they did not punish another student for using
the same sexual metaphor in favor of a competing candidate-
that would be an indication that the school was not acting merely
to prevent students from using lewd language. The Court's
analysis of that restraint on expression would likely be very
different. Some justification would be necessary for the school's
behavior that would make sense of its different treatment
of these similarly situated students.3 2  Thus, viewpoint
discrimination is not necessarily impermissible when a school
restricts student expression, but it may cast doubt on the
justification offered by school officials for that restriction. What
matters is that the school's rationale for punishing Fraser lined
up with the form of content discrimination in which it engaged,
and the Court concluded that that rationale was constitutionally
permissible.333
" See id. at 429-31; supra note 116 and accompanying text. This point makes
sense of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Jacobs that clothing restrictions that
discriminate by viewpoint-and perhaps by content-are subject to more searching
review than policies that are viewpoint-and content-neutral.
30 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969).
3" Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
33 Indeed, this is a reason to be skeptical that the school sponsored the student
speech in Fraser. Presumably, a school could endorse one student candidate for office
but not another (a form of government speech) but that seems insufficient to justify
allowing students at an assembly to make a certain kind of argument in favor of one
candidate but not another.
I This point is reminiscent of the Court's qualification in R.AV. v. City. of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), that government may discriminate based on content
regarding unprotected speech when its justification for doing so is to prohibit speech
for the very reason it is unprotected in the first place, even though the Court missed
the mark when it suggested that doing so necessarily would not involve viewpoint
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In sum, viewpoint discrimination in the public schools is not
only permissible, it is inevitable; otherwise, schools could not
choose what to teach and what not to teach and they could never
say any answer on an examination is right or wrong. But
viewpoint discrimination can be an indication of the function a
school performs and of whether it performs that function in a
permissible manner. In other words, it can be a proxy for
defining the role of a school and a way to assess whether the
school has played that role in a manner consistent with the
Constitution.
4. Imminence
Similar issues arise about the ordinary requirement that
harms from speech must be imminent to provide a basis for
government regulation. Outside of the school context, courts
generally require an imminent threat of harm if incitement to
unlawful activity is the justification for restricting expression.334
The Morse Court was unclear about the role of this requirement
in the school setting. On one hand, the Morse Court implied that
it did not necessarily apply. 3 On the other hand, the Court also
emphasized that the harm from speech encouraging drug use is
imminent-or at least "serious and palpable"--and thus, more
appropriately subject to school regulation than speech that
merely gives rise to "'undifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disturbance' or 'a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.' "336
discrimination. See id. at 388 ("When the basis for the content discrimination
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable,
no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason,
having been adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire class of
speech from First Amendment protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of
distinction within the class.").
3 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 1, § 11.3.2.5, at 998-1000.
'3 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409-10 (2007).
336 Id. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508-09 (1969)). Similarly, Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that the
imminence requirement extends to the school setting, albeit perhaps in a less strict
form. See id. at 439. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Wihile conventional speech may be
restricted only when likely to 'incite imminent lawless action,'. . . it is possible that
our rigid imminence requirement ought to be relaxed at schools." (citation omitted)
(quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449)).
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Along these lines, Justice Alito's concurrence, in an apparent
attempt to limit the holding in Morse, adopted a somewhat
modified version of the requirement of imminence. He
acknowledged that ordinarily government may restrict speech
only when it "presents a threat of violence."337 Yet he would
interpret Tinker to allow schools "to step in before actual violence
erupts."3 8 His concurrence suggests that imminence is necessary
for a school to restrict student speech but that the degree of
imminence required is much less than outside of the school
context.3 39  As a result, Morse leaves unclear whether some
imminence requirement extends to the school setting and, if
it does, how precisely that requirement is different from
conventional free speech cases.
To clarify this issue, the key once again is to attend to the
school function at issue. By doing so, the requirement of
imminent harm can be adapted to the school setting in much the
same way as the ban on viewpoint discrimination. For some
school functions, a concern about imminent harm makes little
sense. A school might award a prize for the best essay on the
importance of education and offer to publish the piece in the
school newspaper. The school might then deny the prize to a
student who writes a brilliant essay against education, even if
the essay poses no imminent risk of harm. The possibility of
imminent harm would simply not be pertinent.
In other settings, however, schools perform a function in
which imminence may matter. If school officials silence student
speech to prevent violence, for example, some version of the
requirement of imminence could well apply. In that context, it
makes sense to require a prospect of violence with some certainty
and within a reasonable time span. 4 ° Otherwise, a school could
justify almost any restriction of student expression on this basis.
On the other hand, schools should be allowed to intervene when
violence is less imminent than would be necessary in another
Id. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09).
39 This understanding makes sense of his assertion that, compared to student
speech that may lead to violence, "[s]peech advocating illegal drug use poses a threat
to student safety that is just as serious, if not always as immediately obvious." Id.
340 See id. at 424-25.
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context. 4' As the custodians of children, school officials need not
tolerate as high a risk of violence as, say, police officers on a
public sidewalk. 42
Indeed, these points about the role of viewpoint
discrimination and imminence are by no means limited to the
school setting. Consider again the Supreme Court's decision in
Rust. The Court permitted viewpoint discrimination, and did not
inquire into the need to prevent any imminent harm, in holding
that the government could subsidize speech about family
planning but prohibit speech about abortion.343 The conclusion
that government acted within its appropriate role as patron
rendered these issues irrelevant to the free speech analysis.
Thus, attention to the role of government can help to make
sense of the interplay between the free speech rules for schools
and the ordinary free speech rules. For both sets of rules, when
government remains within its constitutionally permissible role
as patron, it may be able to discriminate by point of view or
restrict speech for reasons other than to prevent imminent harm.
But viewpoint discrimination and imminence may provide clues
about whether government is acting as a patron in a
constitutionally permissible way.
IV. POSTSCRIPT: CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS
This Article thus far has operated at an intermediate level of
generality. It has risen above the formal requirements of
doctrine in an effort to organize legal rules that on their own
terms do not cohere. But in doing so, it has not sought any
overarching justification for why the rules take the form they do.
That grander enterprise is valuable, but it also comes with risks,
at least if the goal is descriptive accuracy. Theory not only holds
the potential for a more satisfying explanation of free speech law,
it also can lead to an account of how cases should be decided
rather than of how they have been and are likely to be decided.
Both the potential and pitfalls of theoretical analysis are
evident in the work of Robert Post, who has made the greatest
contribution to understanding the significance of role of
government in free speech law.3" His work can help to explain
31 See id.
342 See id. at 425.
3 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-200 (1991).
' See sources cited supra note 17.
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some of the deep tensions in the school speech cases, tensions
that arise to varying degrees in numerous doctrines that turn on
an assessment of the role of government. But the school speech
cases also suggest some refinements or shifts in emphasis that
may improve the descriptive accuracy of Post's theory. Moreover,
while Post's work enriches our understanding, his preoccupation
with the role of government-and with developing a theory to
account for its importance in free speech law-has led him astray
in describing free speech doctrines that focus on other issues.
A. Constitutional Domains and the Public Schools
Before pursuing these claims, some background is necessary
regarding Post's work. Distilling some key points from a complex
argument, he identifies three constitutional domains: democracy,
management, and community. 45 The role government may play
varies by domain. Each domain correlates reasonably well to the
roles of government as we define them.
Democracy is a realm dedicated to a polity's "self-
determination."34 6 Free speech is, of course, a crucial ingredient
in self-determination.347 Within the domain of democracy, courts
should be vigilant to ensure that government does not interfere
with free debate and discussion, a process necessary to determine
the ends citizens as individuals and society as a whole should
pursue. 48 Democracy holds sway on the public sidewalks, in
newspapers, and in various other settings. 49 We would say that
when government operates in the democratic domain, it plays the
role of regulator.
Management is concerned with giving effect to the decisions
reached through a democratic process.3 50 It follows "the logic of
instrumental rationality.""' In the realm of management,
government must be allowed to constrain speech in service of the
goals the democratic process has assigned to it. 352  School
teachers may thus punish students who discuss politics or other
345 See CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 2.
34 Id. at 6.
3 Id. at 7.
See id. at 6-10.
' See id. at 202-03 (discussing free expression on public sidewalks); id. at 254-
55 (discussing newspapers).
a Id. at 4-6.
351 Id. at 5.
352 Id. at 4-6.
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irrelevant topics in mathematics class, librarians may require
silence in reading rooms, and prison officials may suppress
various forms of speech to further penological ends. 53 We would
characterize government in this realm as patron, and more
specifically, as manager or proprietor.
Finally, community attends to "a framework of shared
beliefs, interests and commitments," 354 a framework that
maintains the norms that "define both individual and social
identity."355 Among other values, community fosters the "social
cohesion necessary to facilitate the processes of collective self-
determination."356 Values that public schools may instill in
students-including respect for others-reflect the nation's
commitment to community.3 57 Government action in this realm,
too, we would characterize as in the role of patron and, more
specifically, as manager or proprietor.
In sum, democracy is about making decisions, management
about implementing those decisions, and community a necessary
predicate for both of those endeavors. We would say that
government acts as regulator in the realm of democracy and as
manager or proprietor in the realms of management and
community. Our view and Post's are, therefore, complementary
in significant measure, although, as discussed below, 5 8 Post's
domains fit awkwardly with government as speaker or sponsor of
speech.
Attention to Post's constitutional domains may cast light on
the school speech cases. Public schools implicate each domain to
some extent. Tinker can perhaps be understood as emphasizing
the domain of democracy. As Tinker recognized, schools must
leave ample room for students to engage in the kind of discussion
and debate essential to self-determination. 9
" Id. at 199-267 (discussing managerial role of government in various
contexts).
" Id. at 3 (quoting PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL
THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 358 (1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
355 Id.
11 Id. at 14.
... See id. at 193 n.77 (discussing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 681 (1986)).
31 See infra Part IV.B.2.
... See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14
(1969).
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As to management, as Tinker noted, officials running a
school must remain free to prevent disruptions and to protect the
rights of students. 6
Tinker also arguably was attentive to community, if in a
subtle way. To be sure, the Court rejected the idea that
government may "so conduct its schools as to 'foster a
homogeneous people.' ",361 But the Court valued student speech
not only as part of the democratic process, but also as a means of
preparing students to engage in democratic practice: "The
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of
authoritative selection."362 In other words, schools should instill
in students the ability to participate in-and govern-a free
society. Hence, Post writes of the importance to democracy of "a
'nonneutral' educational system aimed at 'cultivating the kind of
character conducive to democratic sovereignty.' "363
Fraser and Hazelwood were more obvious in their
commitment to the domain of community. The approach they
adopted to student speech emphasized the need to teach a
common commitment to civility that would contribute to social
cohesion. Fraser thus quoted Justice Black's dissent in Tinker to
the effect that teachers, parents, and elected school officials
should not "surrender control of the American public school
system to public school students."364 Fraser further suggested
that schools may restrict speech so that students might
demonstrate appropriate "civil" discourse to one another, in a
sense conscripting "older students" to serve as "role models" who
must display "civil, mature conduct"365 for the benefit of younger
" See id. at 513. An overlap may exist here with the domain of community. A
school, for example, may protect student rights as part of an effort to preserve the
norms essential to social cohesion.
361 Id. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
362 Id. at 512 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
363 CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 192 (quoting AMY GUTMANN,
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 41-47 (1999)). Here, too, there may be an overlap of
constitutional domains. Instilling these essential values could be considered part of
the internal function of schools, and therefore, may also lie in the managerial
domain.
36 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) (quoting Tinker,
393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Id. at 683.
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students. Hazelwood followed a similar line of reasoning, also
noting with approval Fraser's quotation from Black's dissent in
Tinker.366 Indeed, it would seem more than mere coincidence
that Post emphasizes the same word-that is, "civility"-when
describing the commitment to common values necessary to
maintain social cohesion. 67  Post himself recognizes that the
more recent school speech cases prioritize the social cohesion of
community over the free debate of democracy, allowing schools to
impose "legal restrictions on speech where necessary to inculcate
'the habits and manners of civility ... indispensable to the
practice of self-government.' "368
Finally, Post's work suggests an understanding of Morse as
taking a particularly expansive view of the domain of community
in the public schools. From this perspective, Morse can be seen
as privileging a shared commitment against use of illegal drugs
over other values, a commitment of sufficient importance that
officials may silence student speech that could encourage drug
use, even at the risk of constricting the domain of democracy. It
is hard otherwise to make sense of the Court's apparent lack of
concern about quashing open discussion among students.
B. Refining the Determination of Role of Government
Post's framework contributes wonderful insights about the
structure of free speech law. These can refine our understanding
of the school speech cases, even as those cases can refine Post's
framework.
36 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 n.4 (1988). The school
cases confirm the complex interplay of the domains of democracy, management,
and community. Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood can all be understood as sharing a
belief that officials in running a school (management) should attempt to create a
commitment among students (community) to the values essential to decision making
(democracy). Tinker worried, in effect, that excessive control of student speech-in
the name of management or community-could lead schools to become "enclaves of
totalitarianism," Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, an environment that would ill prepare
students to participate in democracy. See id. at 512. Fraser and Hazelwood were
concerned that excessive license of student speech-in the name of democracy-
could produce anarchy, a setting that would not teach students the basic civility
essential in a democracy. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. No
wonder Post asserts: "We might say that community, management, and democracy
are simultaneously complementary and contradictory." CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS,
supra note 17, at 2.
367 CONSTITuTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 183-84, 193, 194.
31 Id. at 193 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681).
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A key insight along these lines, with which we agree, is that
social practices play a crucial role in determining the protection
courts will afford expression.369 In other words, he recognizes
that whether government acts in the domain of democracy,
management, or community depends on context.
This is true, for example, when government opens up its
property for private communication, a situation addressed by the
public forum doctrine.3 0 The nature of the forum government
creates will depend on the role of that forum in our society. This
view makes sense of the Supreme Court's holding that in light of
longstanding social practice, public sidewalks are realms of
relatively free and unfettered communication,371 privileging the
democratic domain,372 whereas Air Force bases serve first and
foremost as means for maintaining an effective military,373 an
instrumental function predominantly managerial in nature.374
Courts cannot easily invent or impose social practices. They
recognize what already exists. In other words, as Post points out,
identifying the relevant constitutional domain for free speech
purposes is, in significant measure, a descriptive enterprise. 5
This point is valuable. It holds the promise of a shift from
impractical and unworkable broad claims about when
government may and may not interfere with speech-for
example, that government cannot discriminate by point of
view. It offers instead a focus on the kind of judgment about
context that underlies many court decisions, a judgment that
distinguishes a history teacher, on one hand, subtracting points
from an examination because a student incorrectly asserts that
World War II never occurred from, on the other hand, punishing
a student for making the same point in a private conversation in
the cafeteria. The former restriction is an integral part of a
school's function within the domain of management (and perhaps
community) whereas the latter is suspect, lying as it does in the
369 See id. at 252-55.
.7. See id. at 199-267 (discussing role of government and the public forum
doctrine).
371 See id. at 202-05.
12 See id. 252-53.
373 See id. at 237-38.
"' See id. at 238.
171 See Between Government and Management, supra note 17, at 1800.
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domain of democracy. We would make a similar point by
explaining that government acts as patron in administering an
examination but as regulator in censoring speech in the cafeteria.
But Post's exposition of constitutional domains also can
mislead in a couple of ways that our framework would not. First,
recognition of the importance of description in accounting for
relevant social practices can obscure the normative judgments
made by courts. Second, at times, Post sacrifices descriptive
accuracy to maintain theoretical purity.
1. Normative Judgment in Characterizing Role of Government
Social practices figure centrally in demarcating the boundary
between government acting in its democratic and managerial
capacities,376 and an assessment of social practices is in large
measure descriptive. 77 Those two propositions could lead to the
conclusion that a court in categorizing the role of government,
should make a descriptive, not a normative, assessment. And,
indeed, Post appears to have reached just that conclusion, at
least at one time in analyzing the public forum doctrine. 8
This appears to be the implication when Post-with typical
candor-notes some potential concerns with his proposed
reformulation of public forum doctrine.3 7 9  He suggests that
whether government property is a public forum depends on "the
social practices within which it is embedded." 380  Given that
government has a great deal of control over the social practices
that occur on its property, Post reasons that it could alter those
practices and by so doing could shift a forum from the democratic
to the managerial domain. 1 Indeed, he implies a very expansive
view of government's ability to take this measure, provided that
government actually changes the relevant social practice and
does not merely declare what the practice should be.382
Consider the U.S. Postal Service as an example. United
States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns3a
addressed a challenge to a federal statute prohibiting placement
176 See id. at 1800-09.
177 See id. at 1801.
378 See id.
379 Id. at 1800-09.
1 Id. at 1800.
11 Id. at 1801.
182 See id.
a 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
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of unstamped mail in private mailboxes.3 8 4 As Post explains,
the Court held that the statute was constitutional, reasoning,
in effect, that private mailboxes are a part of the internal
governmental function of delivering United States mail.38 1 Post
argues that the decision was incorrect-that the longstanding
social practice of using private mailboxes as a means for
delivering private messages establishes them as part of the
democratic domain.38 6 On the other hand, Post contends that if
the government were to effect a change in that social practice-if
it were, say, to place private mailboxes "under lock and key
controlled by [Postal] Service personnel"38V-then the statute
would be constitutional.3 8 8  By changing the social practice,
according to Post, government can alter the demands of the First
Amendment in a particular setting. 38 9
While this view has some force, it does not adequately
acknowledge the normative dimension of interpreting a social
practice. The Court could-and perhaps did-identify the
defining feature of private mailboxes as facilitating delivery of
mail by the U.S. Postal Service. Any private interference it
might treat as an aberration. That determination would entail
both a descriptive assessment and a normative assessment.
Whether any particular conduct is part of a social practice
depends both on how well a description that includes the conduct
fits actual behavior and on how strong a justification there is to
include the conduct as part of the practice. 9 ° A strong enough
need on the part of the U.S. Postal Service might support an
interpretation of the relevant social practice that minimizes the
significance of some private uses of private mailboxes.
And the converse might be true as well. The Court could
prohibit the governmental conduct necessary to reform a social
practice. Thus, pace Post, the Supreme Court might hold that a
law subjecting private mailboxes to supervision under lock and
key by the U.S. Postal Service is itself unconstitutional.39'
384 Id. at 116.
' See Between Government and Management, supra note 17, at 1787.
3 Id. at 1794-95.
387 Id. at 1801.
See id.
s Id.; see also id. at 1794-95.
o See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 160 (1985).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (noting limited
power of Congress to convert the sidewalk outside of Supreme Court building into a
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Indeed, as noted above, an issue along these lines arose in
the school speech cases. As Justice Alito noted in his concurring
opinion, one of the arguments that the school made in Morse-
and that the Court rejected-was that "the First Amendment
permits public school officials to censor any student speech
that interferes with a school's 'educational mission.' ",392 Alito
condemned this approach as, in effect, ceding to school officials
the power to define their mission in a manner that would
eliminate students' free speech rights. He noted that "elected
and appointed public officials" and "school administrators and
faculty" define a school's mission, and they could potentially do so
to "includ[e] the inculcation of whatever political and social
views" they hold. 93 As he concluded, "The 'educational mission'
argument would give public school authorities a license to
suppress speech on political and social issues based on
disagreement with the viewpoint expressed. The argument,
therefore, strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment."394
Our view finds confirmation in this aspect of Alito's
concurrence. He recognizes that government does not have
complete discretion to shape its mission. That discretion is
bounded both by a normative assessment of the relevant social
practices and, ultimately, by rigid commitments built into the
Constitution.
To a limited extent, Post's analysis also can make sense of
Alito's reasoning. He would acknowledge that local officials
should not by mere declaration be able to change the social
practices of our public schools. But his discussion of
Greenburgh395 appears to miss the point that the Court for
normative reasons might also reject government efforts to change
social practices and thereby to alter the constraints of the First
Amendment. It might do so by treating those changes as
artificial, not as integral to the practice. As Post elsewhere
acknowledges,396 interpretation of a social practice inevitably
involves a normative judgment: "The enterprise is neither purely
descriptive nor entirely normative. It instead involves a
nonpublic forum); see also Between Governance and Management, supra note 17, at
1802 (challenging this statement from Grace).
392 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
393 Id. at 423.
394 Id.
'95 CONSTITUTIONAL DoMAINs, supra note 17, at 253.
39 Id. at 179 (citing DWORKIN, supra note 58, at 49-65).
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hermeneutic apprehension of social practices, which are
understood as existing independently of the observer and yet as
subsisting in purposive structures whose requirements are
perennially subject to debate and determination."39 v  Post's
analysis of the public forum doctrine at times appears not to take
this point to heart.398
2. Government Itself Acting and the Democratic Domain
A second criticism of Post's analysis of free speech law runs
somewhat deeper. His theoretical framework can lead him to
describe free speech law inaccurately. An important example
arises even within the area where Post's analysis is most
trenchant-cases in which the crux of a court's decision is about
the role of government. In particular, the metaphor of
government itself acting can explain doctrine in some settings
more simply and more accurately than a full-blown assessment of
Post's domains.
This is true regarding government's latitude to speak or
sponsor speech along the lines it prefers, which is well recognized
in recent case law399 and scholarship.4"' Post deemphasizes this
point. He focuses most of his attention in regard to government
subsidizing speech as part of an internal governmental function
(a subtle and important point most judges and scholars overlook).
Consider in this regard Post's article, Subsidized Speech.4"'
The great majority of his analysis is of government managing
speech as part of an internal function, including, for example, a
public university allocating funds to student groups in
Rosenberger,4 °2 a state college system attempting to control the
397 Id.
39" But see, e.g., Subsidized Speech, supra note 17, at 163 ("Ultimately, speech
will be assigned to public discourse on the basis of normative and ascriptive
judgments as to whether particular speakers in particular contexts should
constitutionally be regarded as autonomous participants in the ongoing process of
democratic self-governance."); id. at 171 ("Ultimately the allocation of speech to
managerial domains is a question of normative characterization.").
' See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
833 (1995); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-200 (1991); Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2001).
' See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 27, at 1384-85; Corbin, supra note 70,
at 607; Norton, supra note 64, at 588.
4" Subsidized Speech, supra note 17.
402 Id. at 154-55, 165-67.
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speech of one of its teachers in Perry,4 3 and even the Federal
Communications Commission regulating broadcasters as quasi-
governmental agencies.4 °4
Indeed, a similar point applies even to Post's analysis of
Rust,405 in which the Court upheld government subsidies of
family planning clinics that prohibited counseling regarding
abortion.4 °6 Post characterizes the most sympathetic (but still
unsatisfactory, in his view) reading of the Court's decision in
Rust as "assign[ing]" the government's program "to a managerial
domain," by which he appears to mean an internal government
function, such as controlling the speech of employees within a
government bureaucracy.4 7  He then proffers as the "most
obvious justification" for the restriction "that the government
wished to create family planning clinics that did not include
abortion, and that the HHS regulations served this end."40 Post
rejects this justification, arguing that a government ban on
dissemination of information must ordinarily be
justified by the need to prevent a harm the government may
constitutionally seek to avoid. Because abortion is a
constitutional right, according to Post, it cannot fall in that
category.40 9
Post may well be right in condemning Rust. What
his analysis deemphasizes, however, is the possibility that
government designed the subsidies as a means to enlist doctors
as its representatives to communicate a message inconsistent
with discussion of abortion. This seems to be the implication of
the Rosenberger Court's characterization of the point of Rust:
"When the government disburses public funds to private entities
to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled
nor distorted by the grantee."41 0 But Post's framework does not
403 Id. at 155-56.
404 Id. at 158-63.
405 Id. at 168-76.
40 Id. at 169 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991)).
407 Id. at 171.
Id. at 175.
40 Id.
410 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
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lend itself to recognition that government at times may itself
participate in the democratic domain by speaking or by
sponsoring speech.411
Why does Post place so much emphasis on government
managing internal government functions and so little emphasis
on government speaking or sponsoring speech as part of the
democratic process? A possible answer is that Post's theoretical
framework suggests that courts should substantially limit
government's role in democratic decision making. After all,
government subsidies of private speech could distort the
democratic domain, skewing public debate. As Post recognizes,
for democracy to be meaningful, it must promote "'agreement'
that is 'uncoerced, and reached by citizens in ways consistent
with their being viewed as free and equal persons.' "412 Active
government participation in the decision-making process runs
the risk of coercion, at least in the kind of nuanced
understanding of democracy that Post embraces.413 As he puts
the matter, albeit in another context, "the concept of public
discourse requires the state to remain neutral in the
'marketplace of communities,' ",414 by which he means an even
broader notion of free speech than the proverbial marketplace of
ideas.415
In the end, Post seeks to provide a deep explanation for free
speech doctrine-one sounding in political theory-whereas case
law seems to take more seriously a simple metaphor of the
411 To be fair, near the end of Subsidized Speech, Post provides a complex
analysis to the effect that government allocation of resources can be characterized
in two ways: as a "conduct rule," which regulates the communications of private
citizens; or as a "decision rule," which applies to the "internal direction of
government officials." Subsidized Speech, supra note 17, at 178-79 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Post reasons that subsidies of private speech can fall into
the category of decision rules (what we would call government as patron) rather
than conduct rules (what we would label government as regulator). Id. at 183. In
other words, government shaping of private behavior through incentives can still
remain part of an internal government function and occur within the managerial
domain. Along these lines, he offers the requirement of the National Endowment of
the Arts that applications should be assessed for "decency," id. at 180,-and, for that
matter, "artistic excellence." Id. at 181.
412 CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 17, at 186 (quoting John Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 229-30
(1985)).
413 See, e.g., id. at 7-8 ("Democracy locates agency in the people collectively, who
are authorized to govern themselves.").
414 Id. at 139.
41, See id.
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government acting itself. Free speech doctrine suggests that
government itself speaking has great license to say what it will,
whereas Post's concern for unencumbered democratic debate
might suggest substantial constraints on government's ability to
participate in public debate.
C. The Second and Third Judgments in Free Speech Law
Our disagreement with Post on the points above is largely a
matter of emphasis. The limitations of Post's framework are far
more pronounced when it comes to the second and third
judgments in the inherent framework of free speech law, that is,
the target of government regulation and a constrained cost-
benefit analysis. In regard to these judgments, the same
difficulty figures more prominently. Post's framework may be
normatively sound, but it leads him to views that are difficult to
reconcile with case law.
A full analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but a few
brief comments are in order. As an illustration, consider the
second step in the inherent structure of free speech doctrine. In
our view, the Free Speech Clause applies only when expression is
the target of government regulation. Usually, this step is
obvious: When government prohibits defacement of public
property, its target is conduct, not expression.416 The Free
Speech Clause thus has no bearing. On the other hand, if
government prohibits the advocation of violence, speech is at
issue and the First Amendment applies.417
The difficult situations in this regard involve government
appearing to regulate expression but really regulating conduct,
and government appearing to regulate conduct but really
regulating expression. Or, to put the same point more precisely,
courts struggle when government regulates an act that is
ordinarily expressive, but it may be doing so for reasons
unrelated to the message expressed and, conversely, when it
regulates conduct that is not ordinarily expressive, but it may be
doing so because of the message the conduct expresses. Our view
is that important doctrines are designed to address these two
ambiguous situations: the time, place, and manner doctrine as
a way to contend with government appearing to regulate
416 See Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1252.
7 See id. at 1256 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
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expression but really regulating conduct,418 and the symbolic
conduct doctrine with government appearing to regulate conduct
but really regulating expression.419
What is most relevant for present purposes is that Post has
recognized that the time, place, and manner and symbolic
conduct doctrines can be understood as ways to assess the target
of government regulation.42 ° In other words, as a descriptive
matter, his analysis coincides with ours. But he rejects these
doctrines-and criticizes them as, inter alia, "an unmitigated
disaster"421-because they fail adequately to take into
consideration the impact government regulation may have on a
"medium [of] ... communication" 422 or, in other words, on
expression. He thus, in effect, cedes descriptive accuracy in favor
of his normative commitments. Those commitments include
understanding free speech law as protecting the domain of
democracy, even from government regulations that do not aim at
expression.423
D. Conclusion
In sum, Post's work casts valuable light on the possible
theoretical justifications for the role of government in free speech
doctrine. But its very theoretical strength is also its weakness.
At times, it leads him to descriptive inaccuracy, both about how
courts analyze the role of government in some free speech cases
and about how they approach other issues in free speech law.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has described the central part that the role of
government plays in free speech law, particularly in the public
school setting. Its main argument is that attention to that role
can help to weave together the various strands of free speech
doctrine and to make sense of what otherwise seem like
incoherent rules. We have not contended that any given case
418 See id. at 1260-64 (acknowledging this aspect of the time, place, and manner
doctrine but criticizing the doctrine for not adequately taking into consideration
incidental effects on expression).
419 See id. at 1256 (acknowledging this aspect of the symbolic conduct doctrine).
420 See e.g., id. at 1256, 1261-63.
421 Id. at 1261.
42 Id. at 1256.
42' See id. at 1256-57, 1264.
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was rightly or wrongly decided. Our goal, instead, was to
elucidate the issues that come before the Court in student speech
cases.
Our analysis suggests, for example, that Morse is best
understood as permitting schools a very broad role in inculcating
values in students, even by silencing speech that might interfere
with that effort. We further contend that Morse extended the
inculcation function of the public schools to an exceptional
setting-the public sidewalk-in a way that is surprising. The
reasoning of Tinker would have suggested that school officials
could not go so far.
On the other hand, the framework we offer makes clear that
once the Court determined that a school could inculcate an
antidrug message into students in the manner and context that
Principal Morse chose, it is not surprising that her actions
withstood constitutional scrutiny, even though she discriminated
by point of view and even though her actions did not prevent any
imminent harm. Government acting as patron-in the public
school setting and elsewhere-may restrict speech without
necessarily meeting the tests regarding viewpoint discrimination
or imminence that apply to government as regulator.
These insights can refine an understanding of the role of
government not only as relevant to school speech cases, but also
to free speech law as applied to government employees,424 the
public forum doctrine,425 unconstitutional conditions,426 the
military,427 prisons, and other settings.
This Article, however, is part of a much larger project. As
our critique of Post indicates, the role of government is only one
of three essential judgments that together form the inherent
structure of free speech law. We believe a similar clarification is
possible by recognizing that various doctrines can fit within the
two additional judgments at issue in free speech cases: whether
government regulation targets expression and, if so, whether the
constitutionally cognizable benefits of the regulation outweigh
the harms from suppressing speech.429
424 See supra note 31.
425 See generally Between Governance and Management, supra note 17.
426 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
427 See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
428 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 11.4.4, at 1146-50.
429 Not all harms are appropriate for courts to consider as part of this balancing.
See supra note 20.
1125
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Thus, there is much work left to do. Indeed, one outstanding
issue of particular interest is why courts have developed
doctrines of dizzying intricacy rather than address in a forthright
manner the three basic judgments in free speech cases. One
possibility is that the inherent structure of free speech law is
difficult to defend. In particular, the framework we have
discussed in this Article reveals free speech rights to be less
robust than courts may feel comfortable acknowledging. The
notion, for example, that government as patron may impose
restrictions on speech-that it may even discriminate by
viewpoint-is disquieting. Courts may resist this view, even if it
best accounts for the decisions they render.
Another possibility is that judges are ill at ease with the
discretion they must exercise. Our framework distills the key
issues in free speech cases, but it provides no mechanical test for
resolving them. A political judgment-with an ineluctably
normative component-is necessary to distinguish government as
patron from government as regulator. Many judges may resist
this political judgment. Judges in a democracy, this line of
reasoning might go, should make and follow rules, not decide
cases based on vague standards.43 °
But that explanation would be ironic. For in Morse, the
Court appeared to formulate a new rule for cases involving
student speech about illegal drugs without explaining how and
why it departed from the rules articulated in its past decisions or
how lower courts should choose which Supreme Court decision to
follow in a particular student speech case. Identifying a common
underlying judgment-no matter how difficult or abstract-has
to promote judicial accountability and restraint more effectively
than inviting judges to choose among ad hoc rules to reach
whatever result they may want. Surely, a frank recognition of
the inherent structure of free speech law-and the political
judgments it entails-is preferable to proceeding without
acknowledging any unifying structure at all.
430 Scalia makes a characteristic point along these lines in The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
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